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SOME KEY TERMS
To avoid confusion about terminology, the following definitions  
should be borne in mind when reading the text of this report.
 Voluntary adaptive migration  Cross ‑border movement of persons undertaken primarily as an expression of 
personal choice between available options as a means of adapting t o or avoiding 
recurring natural disasters, or adapting to existing and anticipated changes in the 
physical environment. Such movement may be temporary, circular or permanent.
 Forced displacement  Movement away from established homes and communities compelled by reducti‑
ons in food and water availability or quality, infrastructure and habitat loss, and in‑
creased exposure to ill ‑health, injury and even death arising from natural disasters 
or changes in the physical environment in situations where return is not possible.
 Planned relocation  The act of moving people at risk of exposure to hazard, both natural and human‑
‑induced. Reclocation may be of a temporary or permanent nature.
 Cluster  A grouping of states united by some past historical association or other shared 
characteristic in which privileged rights of entry and stay are mutually, but not 
necessarily co ‑extensively, conferred.
 Hub  A state within a cluster, which by reason of its historical roles and responsibilities 
or some other factor, acts as a mobility pivot and exerts considerable influence on 
mobility patterns within a cluster.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
Pacific peoples have had to contend with and adapt to a multiplicity of disruptive and destructive geological and ex‑
treme weather events for centuries. While temporary internal migration and displacement have featured as a response 
to the events in many instances, the current concern about the effects of climate change in the region has generated 
discussion about the extent to which future disasters or slow ‑onset environmental degradation will lead to increased 
cross ‑border mobility or displacement.
This research was commissioned to follow up on recommendations from the Nansen Initiative’s Pacific Regional Con‑
sultation held in May 2013 which concluded that, while having to leave one’s country was the least preferred option for 
Pacific peoples, cross ‑border mobility in the context of natural disasters and environmental degradation was a reality 
in the Pacific region which demanded that states begin to plan for movement now. It was recognized that voluntary 
migration abroad was only one way, within a set of broader policy options, to prevent future displacement and adapt to 
climate change.
Discussions on cross ‑border mobility tend to focus on permanent migration from Pacific Island countries and territo‑
ries (PICTs) to the Pacific Rim. Much less attention has focused on the migration options among the PICTs themsel‑
ves. Thus, this report broadens the focus by examining how the region’s existing national migration ‑related laws and 
regulations may allow for:
 •  voluntary adaptive international migration of a temporary nature from which, potentially, remittances generated 
while on temporary work permits could be utilised to enhance community resilience and reduce risk of future dis‑
placement; and, 
 •  transitions to residence in another country to facilitate, over time, the relocation of at ‑risk households and commu‑
nities away from vulnerable locations.
As there is no single comprehensive database of migration laws, regulations and policies for Pacific countries, this study 
is based on material from published literature, open ‑source websites and correspondence with officials and colleagues 
in the Pacific.
In this report, we identify sub ‑regional clusters of states in which one state may, but not always, act as a mobility ‘hub’. 
The report examines the extent to which this architecture, as currently expressed though immigration law and the re‑
gulation of employing migrant labour, allows or impedes the undertaking of voluntary adaptive migration or planned 
relocation as a means to reduce the risk of forced displacement in the future. It considers three main issues:
 •  To what extent do Pacific states grant visa free or visa ‑on ‑arrival entry rights to citizens of other Pacific countries?
 •  How easy is it for Pacific visitors to other Pacific countries to obtain, or transition to, short ‑term work visas/permits 
without having to leave the country they are visiting?
 •  What pathways to residence exist? If long ‑term or permanent stay becomes necessary or unavoidable, what scope 
for residency exists under current policies in the region?
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Pacific populations in 2013: key features
The most recent available population data for the three sub ‑regions of the Pacific ‑ Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia 
‑ reveal a number of features of critical importance in understanding existing and future potential patterns of cross‑
‑border mobility in the context of natural disasters and climate change.
First, all of the “big” PICTs are in Melanesia (98% of the total land area and 89% of the total population of all PICTs in 
2013), while the small countries are concentrated in Micronesia (7 states and territories with 0.6% of the region’s total 
land area, and 4.7% of its population) and Polynesia (10 states and territories with 1.5% of the land area and 5.9% of the 
population).
Second, there are wide disparities across the region in the extent to which PICTs have significant immigrant populati‑
ons or diaspora. The western Melanesian countries of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, three of the 
largest countries and populations, have very low percentages of immigrants and emigrants. International migration 
contributed very little to overall population change in this sub ‑region in 2013. In Polynesia, on the other hand, the net 
loss of people through international migration (10,400) was almost as large as the contribution made by natural increa‑
se (11,170).
Third, the largest population growth over the coming decades is expected in Melanesia. According to recent projec‑
tions, Melanesia’s population could double by 2050 (from 9,848,100 in 2013, to 18,726,600 in 2050). By comparison, 
Micronesia’s population is projected to increase by around 38% over the same period (from 515,300 to 711,300), while 
Polynesia’s population may only increase by 20% (from 649,500 in 2010 to 782,700 in 2050). Ninety ‑six percent of the 
projected population increase of 9.2 million in the Pacific between 2013 and 2050 is likely to be found in Melanesia.
Towards a regional architecture of clusters and hubs
By the late 19th century, all islands in region had come under the influence of European powers but, despite the emer‑
gence of colonial administrations in most island groups, movement between islands was largely unregulated until the 
early 20th century. Both the colonisation process in the Pacific and the mandate and trusteeship systems developed by 
the League of Nations and United Nations in the aftermath of World Wars One and Two had a profound effect on regi‑
onal mobility. As the population data relating to current immigrant and emigrant populations shows, mobility became 
unevenly distributed during the second half of the 20th century. The decolonisation of the Pacific from the early 1960s 
has produced a wide variety of outcomes for indigenous Pacific peoples as far as their opportunities for movement to 
countries on the Pacific Rim are concerned.
The twin processes of colonisation and trusteeship have provided the foundation for sub ‑regional ‘clusters’ of states 
within which the cluster members have varying levels of privileged access to temporary or permanent residence in 
the former (New Zealand and the United States of America) or continuing (France) colonial, mandate or trustee state 
which acts as a cluster ‘hub’. Over time, more clusters, such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group, have emerged as de‑
velopments of, or counterpoints to, these colonial clusters. The clustering process continues, and arguably new clusters 
are emerging centred on Australia and the Pacific Labour Sending (PAILS) Forum.
The effect of clustering has been to greatly enhance the capacity for cross ‑border mobility overall, albeit in different 
ways. In the colonial clusters, multi ‑tiered structures exist. In these clusters, the degree to which mobility is enhanced 
depends on which tier in which structure the Pacific island citizen exists. Further, regional variability derives from dif‑
ferent bundles of privileged rights of admission and stay conferred. The range of rights include the granting of unfette‑
red right of entry and stay by way of an entitlement to hub ‑state citizenship (New Zealand and the United States); the 
preferential entitlement to residence by targeted quotas (New Zealand); privileged access to the hub ‑state labour market 
(the United States) and temporary work in certain sectors of the hub ‑state economy (New Zealand). In contrast, the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group has a flatter structure in which no state acts as a central hub. Consequently, the effect 
of cluster membership is more homogenous, relating to privileged rights of entry as visitors and temporary access to 
selected occupations within the labour markets of cluster member states.
These regional clusters also overlap with a number of PICTs included in more than one cluster. Clustering provides for 
considerable variation in opportunities for international migration in the three major sub ‑regions of Melanesia, Micro‑
nesia and Polynesia. While clustering has the potential to greatly increase regional mobility, the net effect of clustering 
under current national immigration policy settings in the region is more uncertain. Although important gains have 
been made, notably with New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) work policy, both the Australian Seaso‑
nal Work Program (SWP) and the Melanesian Spearhead Group Skills Movement Scheme provide only limited mobili‑
ty gains. Also, a number of policy interventions at the hub ‑state level have had a negative effect on regional mobility, in 
particular by closing or narrowing existing pathways to residence.
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Cross ‑border population movement: the current visa situation
Visa free/ visa ‑on ‑arrival
The review revealed that, between PICTs, there is a large degree of mutual privileging in terms of granting visa waivers 
or visa ‑on ‑arrival for visitors or tourism purposes. In contrast, Pacific Rim countries do not generally grant waivers or 
visa ‑on ‑arrival status to citizens of Pacific countries unless they also happen to have hub ‑state citizenship conferred 
on them by reason of their status within the relevant cluster. This may have important consequences for individuals or 
households wishing to respond to climate change or other disasters by moving across regional borders. At a base level, 
and putting all other considerations aside, current immigration laws in the Pacific mean this is far more likely to be 
actualized by travelling to another island country than to the Pacific Rim countries even if this means transiting throu‑
gh Australia or New Zealand to get to a preferred Pacific destination.
Work permits
Entry into a country is only the first step. In both the context of voluntary adaptive migration and planned relocation, 
the ability of migrants to find work will be an integral component of any durable solution. The picture as regarding 
transition from visitor to work visas is mixed; there is no dominant practice that is common throughout the region.
For individuals with professional or trade skills, existing bilateral and regional agreements related to skilled migrants 
already create opportunity to move abroad. At a broader level, however, there are a number of features of the present 
legal frameworks regulating the employment of non ‑resident labour in the region which are potentially limiting. Legal 
frameworks in PICTs generally privilege the right of host ‑state citizens and residents to employment. In many instan‑
ces, the employer must obtain prior authority to recruit non ‑resident workers.
It is not uncommon for there to be highly prescriptive requirements for gaining approval. When granted, access to 
employment in Pacific countries is often highly regulated and controlled. Visas are typically granted for work with 
a specific employer. Many countries in the region have binding legal repatriation provisions. These features, common 
in many regions, may impact the ability of national immigration systems to respond to disasters by facilitating cross‑
‑border migration in a timely or sustained fashion. Further, several countries have a list of reserved occupations, or 
specify a fixed quota or percentage of non ‑citizens or non ‑residents who may work for an employer, with the remainder 
of the workforce positions reserved for citizens or permanent residents.
These features of national employment regulations in the region are designed to provide the maximum employment 
opportunities for rapidly growing citizen populations. Consequently they present obstacles to the employment of 
persons who do move across international borders but who are not granted host ‑state residence or citizenship in the 
destination state. This issue will need to be factored into discussions around both voluntary adaptive migration and 
planned relocation along with more familiar issues such as land tenure and access to land by non ‑citizens.
Residence
Immigration frameworks in the region contain a range of pathways to residence. Reflecting historical immigration 
policy settings, as well as concerns over land ownership, a common pathway to residence is provided for spouses and 
dependent children of host ‑state citizens. In host ‑states with established diaspora, spousal residence will be a useful 
policy mechanism for facilitating voluntary adaptive migration over time. That said, sponsorship criteria surrounding 
minimum sponsor income levels, or a specified minimum duration of the marriage, may limit the potential for this 
pathway to be leveraged.
Although family life throughout the Pacific typically involves extended family networks spanning closely ‑knit commu‑
nities or villages, most immigration policies in the region have no specific provisions aimed at facilitating the migrati‑
on of the wider family group. Australia and New Zealand have parent residence categories but they are closely contro‑
lled and current policy settings in both countries limit this as a viable pathway to residence for many Pacific families. 
The closure of the adult sibling category in New Zealand in 2012 further limits the possibility for the chain migration 
of family members as a means of facilitating the voluntary adaptive migration or relocation of communities over time. 
A further limiting feature of current policies is that a number of PICTs have caps on the total number of permanent 
residence visas that can be granted to persons who do not qualify under pathways arising from marriage to a citizen or 
other privileged categories of migrants.
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Conclusions
In the Pacific region, immigration laws sit within and reflect a multiplicity of partially overlapping and evolving sub‑
‑regional clusters of states, giving rise to a highly ‑textured migration landscape. The variability, both between and 
within clusters, provides a multiplicity of policy nodes around which regional state interests could converge and tran‑
slate into future action in addressing the potential for cross ‑border movement in the context of natural disasters and 
slow ‑onset processes linked with climate change.
Special account needs to be taken of the variable patterns of population change in the region, especially in Melanesia 
where the great majority of the region’s population live but who, in relative terms, possess the narrowest range of op‑
portunities for undertaking cross ‑border movement as a means of adapting to environmental stressors under current 
policy settings. The small diasporas of Papua New Guineans, Solomon Islanders and Ni ‑Vanuatu have significant se‑
condary consequences for mobility in that there are very small proportions of people overseas with the familial links to 
provide either the necessary sponsorship and/or financial support to enable migration under family reunion categories, 
where they exist, or as visitors. Yet, it is these countries where the largest population growth is expected to occur in 
coming decades.
At a base ‑level, there exists a high degree of mobility between Pacific Island states under the extensive visa free or 
visa ‑on ‑arrival privileges that are mutually extended to citizens of Pacific countries. Avenues for leveraging this basic 
form of freedom of movement need further attention. The employer ‑led nature of the work permit regime in many 
counties is a potentially limiting feature of migration laws in the region in the context of voluntary adaptive migration 
or planned relocation, and regulations surrounding the employment of non ‑citizen labour will need to be factored into 
future discussions. A fundamental determinant of the responsiveness of immigration policy to the challenges of volun‑
tary adaptive migration and planned relocation is the extent to which chain migration of members of the wider family 
group, such as parents and siblings (and their families), is allowed. Again, here, the responsiveness of current policy 
settings in the region is limited.
The importance of diaspora communities in facilitating the provision of durable solutions, both as regards voluntary 
adaptive migration and planned relocation, needs acknowledging. Not only do diaspora communities provide housing 
and support, but a large established diaspora that is sufficiently embedded in the host ‑state economy will also be better 
placed to leverage transitions to work visas for kin, or to facilitate their entry as holders of work visas. Policies aimed at 
promoting the chain migration of communities and enabling their full integration into the host ‑state economy will be 
crucial over the coming decades.
In the post ‑disaster setting, states should be encouraged to develop humanitarian policies which expressly allow for 
the temporary entry or, at the very least, the non ‑expulsion of non ‑nationals affected by natural disaster. However, 
current policy mechanisms are amenable to adjustment in ways which would allow people affected by natural disasters, 
including those linked with climate change, to make voluntary choices about moving from places where environmental 
change is severely compromising long ‑term residence. Existing immigration laws, regulations and policies should be 
revisited with reference to:
 •  Making allowance for the in ‑country change of immigration status and, in particular, to allow for the transition 
from visitor to worker status.
 •  Providing a pathway to residence based on a specified period of lawful presence and stay in the host countries.
 •  Reviewing requirements for sponsorship for residence in cases where the applicant is from a community at risk to 
adverse effects of natural disasters and slow ‑onset processes linked to climate change.
 •  Making allowance for the entry and stay of parents and other close family members of residents originating from 
at ‑risk communities.
 •  Increasing the flexibility of policies and capacity of quotas under existing bilateral special relationships which con‑
fer privileged rights of entry and stay (such as the Pacific Access Category in New Zealand). 
Clusters and Hubs: Toward a Regional Architecture for Voluntary Adaptive Migration in The Pacific 11
The latest Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, From Shared Risk to Shared Value: 
The Business Case for Disaster Risk Reduction, suggests that “SIDS [Small Island Developing States] 
are probably the group of countries where investments in disaster risk reduction and climate change 
adaptation are likely to reap the greatest benefits.” (UNISDR, 2013, 106). The report observes: “Most of 
the countries with a large proportion of their total produced capital at risk to earthquakes, cyclonic wind 
damage and tsunamis are SIDS.” UNISDR lists five Pacific countries in its top 15 at risk to disasters in 
the world: Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands (Pacific Island Reports, 11 October, 
2012). Pacific SIDS regularly feature within the top 10 countries for expected annual and probable 
maximum losses from earthquakes (Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Tonga, Papua New Guinea), cyclonic 
winds (Tonga, Samoa, Fiji), tsunami (Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, 
French Polynesia, Fiji, Palau) (UNISDR, 2013, 107-108) (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Island States and Territories in the Pacific
1. INTRODUCTION
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An estimated 318,000 people in Oceania have been 
displaced by sudden ‑onset disasters over the past five 
years and, in 2012, Samoa and Fiji were among the ten 
countries worldwide with the highest per capita levels of 
displacement (Petz, 2013). Yet, Pacific peoples have had 
to contend with and adapt to a multiplicity of disruptive 
and destructive geological and extreme weather events 
for centuries.1 The thousands of inhabited coral atolls, 
volcanic and continental islands are surrounded by 
a volcanic ‘ring of fire’, and occupy a vast oceanic space 
in which tsunamis, tropical cyclones and associated 
storm surges, flooding and periodic droughts have fea‑
tured in their lives since the islands began to be settled 
by humans more than 30,000 years ago. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the Pacific Islands and their inhabi‑
tants feature prominently in discussions at international 
meetings and in an extensive academic literature2 about 
population movement within and between islands in 
response to natural disasters.
In many instances, particularly in the wake of tropical 
cyclones, temporary internal migration has occurred3. 
The current concern about the effect of anthropoge‑
nically–influenced climate change on the region has 
generated discussion about likely patterns of future 
migration, especially the extent to which this will 
necessitate increased cross ‑border migration of affec‑
ted individuals, households, communities, and indeed, 
whole populations.
Contemporary cross ‑border migration is dominated 
by three major flows: migration from Pacific island 
countries and territories (PICTs) to countries on the 
Pacific Rim (especially New Zealand, Australia and 
the United States of America); trans ‑Tasman migration 
between New Zealand and Australia; and intra ‑regional 
migration between the PICTs. Discussion surrounding 
cross ‑border migration in the context of the impacts of 
climate change in the Pacific has tended focus on the 
first of these flows, and then on the issue of whether the‑
se migrants ought to be given some form of permanent 
status under immigration law. These are undoubtedly 
valid questions to pose, and the right of states under 
international law to control entry into their territory, as 
an integral component of sovereignty (Brownlie, 2008; 
Opeskin et al., 2011), means it is always open to states to 
introduce new policies aimed at facilitating the migra‑
tion of those affected by natural disasters4. This report 
broadens the focus by examining how the region’s exis‑
ting national migration laws and regulations may allow 
for voluntary adaptive migration of a temporary nature 
and, over time, facilitate transitions to residence in an 
another country. Potentially, remittances generated 
while on temporary work permits could be utilised 
to enhance community resilience and reduce risk for 
future displacement, while transitions to residence may 
facilitate the relocation of at ‑risk households and com‑
munities away from vulnerable locations.
As a manifestation of the nation ‑state, the modern 
border is as much a legal construct as a physical one, 
especially in a region of islands where most borders 
are lines on a map through spaces occupied by ocean. 
Through a review of available immigration and non‑
‑resident employment laws and regulations, this report 
charts the extent to which there is freedom of movement 
between the different island states as well as to countries 
on the Pacific Rim. We identify a multiplicity of sub‑
‑regional clusters of states in which privileged rights of 
entry, stay and labour market access are conferred. The 
current legal and regulatory frameworks are examined 
to assess their impact upon the ability of Pacific peoples 
to move not just to the Pacific Rim, but also between 
island countries on a temporary and permanent basis, as 
a means of adapting or responding to natural disasters.
This study is based on material that we have been able 
to locate in published literature and on open ‑source 
websites. There is no single comprehensive database of 
migration law, regulations and policies in the Pacific 
region. The website for the Pacific Legal Information 
Institute, a facility provided by the Faculty of Law at the 
University of the South Pacific, has the most compre‑
hensive collection but it is far from complete. Similarly, 
the website of the Pacific Immigration Directors Confe‑
rence, a forum established in 1996 for the official immi‑
gration agencies of the Pacific Region, also contains only 
a partial list of relevant legislation and regulations5.
For population data, we have made extensive use of 
information that can be obtained from the Secretariat 
of the Pacific Community’s website (www.spc.int/sdd/). 
The time ‑series maintained by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Development has 
also been consulted, along with the UN’s (2013) com‑
pendium of Government views and policies concerning 
population and development for 195 countries. These 
sources contain useful contextual information but 
do not provide details of specific laws, regulations or 
policies.
1 Recent, non ‑meteorological events, include the 2013 earthquake and tsunami in the Santa Cruz Islands in the Solomon Islands, the 2010 
volcanic eruption of Mt Garet in Vanuatu, and the 2009 tsunami in Samoa.
2 See, for example, the bibliographies contained within Barnett and Campbell (2010) and Campbell and Bedford (2013).
3 See, for example, Campbell (1984).
4 There are many examples of this internationally. In the Pacific region, the government of Fiji has stated on a number of occasions that it 
would consider the needs of its neighbours, especially Kiribati and Tuvalu, if their islands became progressively uninhabitable because of 
slow ‑onset environmental change (Bedford and Bedford, 2010, 90). The recent purchase of land in Fiji by the Kiribati government may be 
a precursor to such a step being taken at some point in the future.
5 www.pidcsec.org/index/ (accessed, 11 October 2013).
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It is now well acknowledged that population movement exists along a spectrum ranging from ‘voluntary’ 
at one end to ‘forced’ at the other with a substantial zone of transition in the middle. It is simply not 
possible to draw a clean line between voluntary and forced movement in the context of both sudden-onset 
hazards as well as gradual, slow-onset impacts of climate change. Migration which appears ‘voluntary’ 
on the surface may have ‘forced’ or involuntary components to it. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this 
report, we distinguish between voluntary adaptive migration and forced displacement. We take the 
former to occur when cross-border movement is undertaken primarily as an expression of personal 
choice between available options as a means of adapting to or avoiding recurring natural disasters, 
or adapting to existing and anticipated changes in the physical environment (Kälin, 2013). Forced 
displacement occurs when reductions in food and water availability or quality, infrastructure and habitat 
loss, and increased exposure to ill-health, injury and even death compel people to leave established homes 
and communities in situations where return is not possible. Forced displacement can arise from both 
sudden-onset events and slow-onset processes, without here implying a direct or mono-causality. 
6 It was increasing population pressure on small atolls and reef islands exposed to frequent drought, for example, that led the colonial 
government in what is today Kiribati and Tuvalu to relocate I ‑Kiribati initially on uninhabited islands in the Phoenix Islands (within the colony) 
and later in the Solomon Islands (Maude, 1952; Knudsen, 1977).




7 The concept of “effective population” has been suggested as a useful concept for capturing the essential fluidity of Pacific populations that 
comprise both island ‑based and large overseas ‑based diaspora, such as Cook Islanders, Niueans, Tokelauans, Tongans and Samoans. The 
effective population of a place is the population at any one time that draws on the place’s basic services and facilities (water, sewerage, 
commercial enterprises, accommodation, health services, employment and so on) (Bedford et al., 2006). Where there are high levels of 
circulation between places, the ‘effective’ population includes a share of those who move in and out of a place on a temporary basis, as 
well as those who usually live there. In the Polynesian context, it is a population that captures a part of the diaspora of the group under 
consideration and includes these people in the island ‑based population because there is always some movement through the island of kin as 
visitors and tourists, placing demands on island ‑based services and facilities and being an essential part of the community through the year 
(Bedford, 2008, 279).
We conceptualise voluntary migration to be a means 
of preventing or avoiding displacement or, at the very 
least, allowing at‑risk communities to remain living 
in their homes on their ancestral islands for as long as 
possible. Given the anticpated increases in the regional 
population, which we detail below, it can reasonably be 
expected that disaster‑induced displacement in the re‑
gion will increase although we cannot say by how much. 
Improvement in early warning systems means a greater 
proportion of affected comunties may survive the 
disasters even if their homes and assets are destroyed. 
Furthermore, there is little that people living on low‑ly‑
ing islands can do to change or reduce their exposure 
to storm surges, tsunamis, or sea‑level‑rise. Population 
increases on these islands can lead to increased disaster 
risks including risk of displacement6. 
2.1 SOME CONCERNS ADDRESSED
Concern has been raised that discussion about migrati‑
on in the context of climate change can be both counter‑
productive, focusing attention away from mitigation and 
adaptation, and premature in that the impacts of climate 
change upon the Pacific islands are not yet fully under‑
stood (Montreau and Barnett 2009; Barnett and Webber, 
2009; Barnett and O’Neill, 2012). However, the lived 
experiences of Pacific islanders and scientific data incre‑
asingly highlight the reality of a more climate ‑affected 
region. Failing to plan for migration may lock Pacific 
communities into prolonged disadvantage, economic 
loss, or physical suffering as climate change effects accu‑
mulate through time (Campbell and Bedford, 2013).
A further concern is that, at certain levels, migration 
may also decrease community viability by hollowing 
out the productive age groups in the population, or 
otherwise reducing overall population levels to below 
a minimum required to sustain community life (Bar‑
nett, 2012). While a valid concern, we conceptualise 
migration as encompassing more than unidirectional, 
permanent flows out of the country. Where there are 
existing patterns of extensive circular mobility, rooted 
in a constitutional relationship or some other suffici‑
ently privileged relationship (e.g. the Compact of Free 
Association states vis ‑à‑vis the United States and, per‑
haps, under schemes such as New Zealand’s Recognised 
Seasonal Employer (RSE) work policy), it may be more 
instructive to speak of ‘effective populations’ (Bedford, 
2008, 178‑179)7. From this perspective, voluntary adapti‑
ve migration means any form of cross ‑border movement 
occurring at the individual or household level, whether 
temporary or permanent, seasonal or circular, under‑
taken for the purposes of adapting to, or helping others 
to adapt to, the adverse effects of natural disasters so as 
to reduce the risk of being displaced in the future.
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In order to better understand how the relevant legislative and regulatory frameworks affect 
contemporary patterns of and frame future opportunities for migration in the context of natural 
disasters, it is important to place population movement and its regulation in their historical setting.
3.1 HISTORICAL PATTERNS
Before the region was colonised by European powers, and 
the national borders that define the contemporary states 
were imposed as imaginary lines on the ocean, a vibrant 
and interconnected network of communities co ‑existed 
and flourished in the Pacific. Tongan anthropologist, 
Epeli Hau’ofa (1993; 8), eloquently captured the essence of 
highly mobile pre ‑colonial communities in many parts of 
what he termed a ‘sea of islands’ when he observed:
The world of our ancestors was a large sea full of places 
to explore, to make homes in, to breed generations of 
seafarers like themselves… Theirs was a large world in 
which peoples and cultures moved and mingled unhin‑
dered by boundaries of the kind erected much later 
by imperial powers. From one island to another they 
sailed to trade and to marry, thereby expanding social 
networks for greater flow of wealth. They travelled to 
visit relatives in a wide variety of natural and cultural 
surroundings, to quench their thirst for adventure, and 
even to flight and dominate.
By the late 19th century, all islands in region had come 
under the influence of European powers, principally 
England and France, but also to a lesser extent Germa‑
ny, Spain and the United States of America. Despite the 
emergence of colonial administrations in most island 
groups, movement between islands was largely unre‑
gulated until the early 20th century. In Fiji, the Gilbert 
and Ellice Island Colony and the Solomon Islands 
Protectorate, which were under the Western Pacific 
High Commission’s mandate, Chinese traders, Indian 
indentured labour (Fiji), and other Pacific Islanders 
(usually via marriage) made their way into islands and 
their local communities without great difficulty (Scarr, 
1967; Brookfield, 1972; Howe, 1984). In the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, Solomon Islanders were taken to 
other colonies in Samoa (German) and Fiji (British) to 
work on plantations; I ‑Kiribati and Tuvaluans were wor‑
king on phosphate islands in the central Pacific and in 
French Polynesia; Ni ‑Vanuatu, Solomon Islanders and 
Papua New Guineans were recruited in large numbers 
to work in Australia’s sugar industry in Queensland 
(Moore, Leckie and Munro, 1990; Munro, 1990). Before 
the Second World War, Indo ‑Chinese were recruited 
as indentured labour to work in the French territories, 
especially in New Caledonia’s nickel mines. Their des‑
cendants, like those of the indentured Indian labour in 
Fiji, have become prominent components of the contem‑
porary populations of these countries.8
3. MOBILITY IN THE PACIFIC 
REGION: AN OVERVIEW 
8 There is an extensive literature on indentured labour in the Pacific. Useful short reviews can be found in Moore et al. (1990). See, for 
example, Leckie (1990) on workers in colonial Fiji from 1870‑1970, Winslow (1990) on workers in colonial New Caledonia to 1945, Wilson et 
al. (1990) on Asian workers in the Pacific, Adams (1990) and Connell (1990) on Pacific workers in New Caledonia and Vanuatu, Moore (1990) 
on Pacific Islanders in 19th century Queensland and Munro (1990) for a statistical summary of labour in the Pacific between the 1860s and 
the 1940s.
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Most of the international flows of labour declined 
during the first half of the 20th century as colonial ad‑
ministrations sought to make their territories economi‑
cally self ‑sufficient through extraction of minerals and 
production of agricultural produce for export. Local 
labour was required to support both commercial as well 
as village ‑based production of cash crops to generate 
revenue for the colonial state. As Hau’ofa (1993, 10) 
observed:
Nineteenth century imperialism erected boundaries 
that led to the contraction of Oceania, transform‑
ing the once boundless world into the Pacific Island 
states and territories that we know today. People were 
confined to their tiny spaces, isolated from each other. 
No longer could they travel freely to do what they had 
done for centuries. They were cut off from their rel‑
atives abroad, from their far ‑flung sources of wealth 
and cultural enrichment.
The process of containment was exacerbated in some 
island groups (e.g. Fiji) by restrictions placed on long‑
‑distance travel in ocean ‑going canoes (Sahlins, 1962; 
Bayliss ‑Smith et al., 1988). This ability to move between 
communities and islands was essential for responses and 
adjustments to natural hazards and an important means 
of fostering reslience to such events. As Campbell (1984, 
63‑64) notes, with reference to Fiji:
Rarely was a community under stress from storms 
or drought (or indeed at any time) totally dependent 
on its own resources. Inter ‑village and inter ‑island 
trade flourished in pre ‑European Fiji and in some 
areas well into the twentieth century. Numerous social 
bonds facilitated the exchange of goods in widespread 
but well ‑integrated economic systems… Such inter‑
‑island trade was most notably conducted in the 
form of ceremonial exchange or solevu… Less formal 
exchanges, also based on inter ‑island kinship [which 
could extend beyond the colonial boundaries to Tonga 
in places like eastern Fiji] were probably even more 
important in the alleviation of post ‑disaster food 
scarcity than solevu, which took several months to 
organize.
Another development during the early years of colo‑
nial rule was the progressive movement of people from 
inland locations to settlements along the coast, espe‑
cially in the larger continental islands of the western 
Pacific (Melanesia) and the volcanic islands fringed 
by coral reefs in the eastern (Polynesia) and northern 
(Micronesia) Pacific (Connell, 1987; Bayliss ‑Smith et al., 
1988; Bedford, 2004) (Figure. 2). This internal migration 
of people who had access to land in coastal locations 
was a response to a mix of push and pull factors asso‑
ciated with the development of trade and commerce, 
the establishment of mission stations and the desire by 
colonial administrations to have ready access to local 
communities. An unanticipated consequence of this 
coastward movement of people was an increase in their 
vulnerability to certain hazards, especially storm surges 
associated with cyclones and flooding during major 
storms.
A final dimension of population movement during 
the colonial era that needs acknowledgement was the 
gradual development of towns, mainly in coastal loca‑
tions, especially after the Second World War9. Levels 
of urbanisation in the Pacific vary considerably, as can 
be seen in Table 1, and in parts of the region, especially 
the countries comprising western Melanesia (Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu), the great 
majority of people (75‑80 percent) still live in rural 
communities (Connell, 2011). These are also countries 
with some of the largest populations in the region. The 
dispersed nature of their rural populations is both an 
advantage and a disadvantage in the context of expo‑
sure to the risk of harm and damage caused by natural 
disasters. It is an advantage in that large populations 
are not concentrated in particular coastal locations that 
may be adversely affected by floods or storm surges. 
However, widely dispersed, often isolated, small popu‑
lations are not easily assisted in times of natural disaster 
as has been witnessed recently in the Solomon Islands 
following an earthquake and associated tsunami in the 
Santa Cruz islands on the southern periphery of the 
country’s island chain (Marau, 2013).
3.2 PACIFIC POPULATIONS 
IN 2013: A SUMMARY
Several indices of Pacific places and peoples that are 
relevant for understanding an Oceanic region of diverse 
island groups are captured in Table 1: the land areas of 
the different countries that comprise Melanesia, Micro‑
nesia and Polynesia; their estimated populations in June 
2013 which have been obtained from the Secretariat 
of the Pacific Community’s latest “Population Data 
Sheet 2013” for all PICTs (http://www.spc.int/sdd), and 
estimates of their shares of immigrants and emigrants 
which have been obtained from the 2013 edition of the 
UN Population Division’s “Trends in International Mi‑
gration” database which was prepared for the UN High‑
‑Level Dialogue on Migration and Development that 
was held in New York 2‑4 October 201310. The percent‑
ages for immigrants refer to the share of the estimated 
population that was born overseas (i.e. the life ‑time 
9 Connell and Lea (1993, 1995, 1998, 2002) have produced useful reviews of urbanization in the three major sub ‑regions of the Pacific.
10 These data can be accessed at http://esa.un.org/unmigration/migrantstocks2013.htm?msdo The figures should be treated with caution 
just as the UN Population Division suggests – they are estimates for 2013 based on data compiled from a range of sources. Some of the 
estimates of people resident in Pacific countries who were born overseas seem on the high side, by comparison with recent census data.
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immigrant population) while in the case of emigrants 
the estimated total numbers of people born in each of 
the PICTs, who were living overseas in 2013, are expre‑
ssed as percentages of the estimated total populations in 
Pacific countries (life ‑time emigrant population). These 
are narrow definitions of immigrants and emigrants, by 
comparison with the flows captured by the concept of 
“effective populations” discussed earlier, but they are the 
standard stocks of international migrants referred to in 
the reports of the United Nations.
It is very clear from Table 1 that all of the “big” countries 
in the Pacific are in Melanesia (98 percent of the total 
land area and 89 percent of the total population of all 
PICTs in 2013) while the small ones are concentrated in 
Micronesia (7 states and territories with 0.6 percent of 
the region’s total land area, and 4.7 percent of its popu‑
lation) and Polynesia (10 states and territories (including 
Pitcairn Island not shown in Table 1) with 1.5 percent of 
the land area and 5.9 percent of the population). It is also 
obvious from Table 1 that three of the largest countries 
(and populations) have very low levels of urbanisation 
(Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) 
and very low percentages of immigrants and emigrants. 
These three countries tend to stand out on a number 
of socio ‑demographic indices in the Pacific, especially 
Papua New Guinea which alone has 84 percent of the 
region’s land area and 71 percent of its estimated popu‑
lation of just over 11 million in 2013.
It is also very obvious from Table 1 that there are wide 
disparities across the region in the extent to which 
PICTs have significant immigrant populations (New 
Caledonia in Melanesia; Guam, Northern Mariana 
Islands, Palau and Nauru in Micronesia; American Sa‑
moa, Niue, Tokelau, Cook Islands and Wallis and Futu‑
na in Polynesia) or significant diaspora (Fiji in Melane‑
sia; Palau, Federated States of Micronesia in Micronesia, 
and Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu 
and Wallis and Futuna in Polynesia)11. These differences 
are very important for migration as an adaption strategy 
in the context of natural disaster and climate‑related 
environmental change, as we discuss further below.
11 With regard to the percentages of immigrants in the resident populations, it needs to be kept in mind that these include people from these 
countries who happened to be born overseas, either because of the location of suitable hospitals (e.g. some I ‑Kiribati and Tuvaluan mothers 
go to Fiji’s main hospital for child birth, especially if there are complications with the birth), or because there are large resident populations 
(diaspora) of these islanders in countries like New Zealand, Australia or the United States of America. Thus, for example, the overseas‑
‑born immigrant population on Niue includes NZ ‑born Niueans, as does the Cook Island and Tokelau immigrant overseas ‑born. The large 
overseas ‑born population in American Samoa includes many people born in neighbouring Samoa.
Figure 2: Major Sub‑regions in the Pacific
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Sub-region/country Land area Population Percentages of population
 (km2) (SPC, 2013) Urban Immigrant Emigrant
Melanesia 540,030 9,848,100 20 1.2 2.5
Fiji 18,330 859,200 50 2.7 22.3
New Caledonia 18,580 259,000 67 23.2 2.5
Papua New Guinea 462,840 7,854,400 13 0.3 0.5
Solomon Islands 28,000 610,800 20 0.5 0.7
Vanuatu 12,280 264,700 24 1.2 3.3
Micronesia 3,150 515,300 67 23.3 13.9
Federated States (FSM) 700 102,800 22 2.5 28.5
Guam 540 174,900 94 46.2 3.7
Kiribati 810 103,100 54 2.8 4.7
Marshall Islands 180 53,100 74 3.2 18.6
Nauru 20 10,100 100 20.8 14.9
Nthern Mariana Islands 460 53,900 90 44.9 18.6
Palau 440 17,400 77 32.2 55.7
Polynesia 8,090 649,500 62 14.1 35.9
American Samoa 200 56,500 50 74.0 6.9
Cook Islands 240 15,200 74 21.1 167.8
French Polynesia 3,520 261,300 51 13.3 1.7
Niue 260 1,500 0 33.3 473.3
Samoa 2,940 187,400 20 3.0 68.9
Tokelau 15 1,200 0 25.0 233.3
Tonga 750 103,300 23 5.2 58.4
Tuvalu 25 11,000 47 1.4 36.4
Wallis and Futuna 140 12,100 0 23.1 71.1
Pacific Islands 551,270 11,012,900 23 3.0 5.0
Table 1: Populations and Percentages Urban, Immigrant and Emigrant, 2013
Note: Immigrants are defined as people born overseas living in Pacific countries.
Emigrants are defined as people born in Pacific countries living overseas.
The population’s estimates were prepared by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community.
Data sources:
1) Population and percentages urban, SPC Population Data Sheet, 2013 http://www.spc.int/sdd/
2) Immigrant and emigrant estimates, UN Population Division, Trends in International Migrant Stock, 2013, 
 http://esa.un.org/unmigration/migrantstocks2013.htm?msdo
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3.3 CONTEMPORARY 
MOBILITY PATTERNS
Notwithstanding a long history of population move‑
ment within and between islands and island groups in 
the region, this mobility became unevenly distributed 
during the second half of the 20th century. The deco‑
lonisation of the Pacific from the early 1960s produ‑
ced a wide variety of outcomes for indigenous Pacific 
peoples as far as their opportunities for movement to 
countries on the Pacific Rim were concerned. In the 
early 21st century there are considerable variations in 
these opportunities for international migration in the 
three major sub ‑regions of Melanesia, Micronesia and 
Polynesia.
As we show below with reference to particular clusters 
of countries, islands north of the equator (the former 
Micronesian Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
(TTPI)) have strong but variable links with the United 
States ranging from citizenship (Guam and the Com‑
monwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) to rights 
of entry with possibilities of transitioning to work and 
residence (most of the other countries in the former 
TTPI) (Figure 1). South of the equator, the eastern and 
central Pacific countries from Nauru and Kiribati in 
Micronesia to Fiji in Melanesia, as well as most of the 
Polynesian islands to the east, have links with New 
Zealand, Australia and the United States which again 
range from citizenship or nationality entitlements 
(Cook Islanders, Niueans, Tokelauans in New Zealand; 
American Samoans in the United States) to lengthy 
histories of engagement fostered by churches, educati‑
on and a range of temporary work schemes in the past 
(Crocombe, 2001).
In the western Pacific, especially Papua New Gui‑
nea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, there are strong 
commercial links between the islands and Australia, 
but flows of labour have been small, especially since 
the independence of these countries in 1970s (PNG and 
Solomons) and 1980 (Vanuatu). This is in sharp contrast 
to the situation a century earlier when these three island 
groups provided the main labour force for the deve‑
lopment of Australia’s sugar industry in Queensland. 
Between 1862 and 1904, over 62,000 Pacific Islanders 
were recruited for work in Queensland (Parnaby, 1964; 
Price and Baker, 1976; Munro 1990), a labour trade 
that was known as ‘blackbirding’ and which in its early 
years involved forced migration (Moore, 1990). Over 90 
percent of Queensland’s 19th century labour came from 
western Melanesia with the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) 
providing 63 percent (just under 40,000) of the total 
(Munro, 1990). The termination of Australia’s Pacific la‑
bour trade following the formation of the Commonwe‑
alth of Australia in 1901 saw the repatriation of many 
thousands of Melanesians back to their islands and the 
end of any special migration relationships between Aus‑
tralia and the Pacific until towards the end of the first 
decade in the 21st century when a Pacific Seasonal Work 
Pilot Scheme was introduced (see section on Austra‑
lia’s emergent cluster below).
Notwithstanding some idiosyncratic dimensions to the 
immigrant populations shown in Table 1 (see footno‑
te 10), what is striking is the very small numbers of 
immigrants in relation to their resident populations in 
the three countries of western Melanesia: Papua New 
Guinea – 0.3%; Solomon Islands – 0.5%; and Vanuatu 
‑ 1.2%. At the other end of the regional spectrum, and 
reflecting, in part, the influx of immigrants from Com‑
pact of Free Association States, the immigrant popula‑
tions of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands respectively comprise 49% and 45% of 
the total populations of these two States. In addition to 
having small shares of immigrants in relation to their 
total populations, the three countries in western Mela‑
nesia also have very small diaspora by comparison with 
their resident populations and with the much smaller 
populations of countries in the eastern and northern 
Pacific (Table 1). Inhabitants of Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu thus have more limited 
opportunities for international migration when compa‑
red to inhabitants of other countries in the Pacific.
The highly variable contribution that international 
migration is currently making to population change 
in PICTs can be seen in the estimates of the two major 
components of growth in the year ended June 2013 – 
natural increase and net migration (Table 2).
Whereas natural increase (the balance of births over 
deaths) added just over 200,000 people to the population 
of Melanesia in 2013, net migration (the balance of in‑
‑migration over out ‑migration) was small – a net loss of 
4,340 for the region as a whole and most of this from Fiji. 
International migration contributed very little to overall 
population change in this sub ‑region in 2013. In Poly‑
nesia, on the other hand, the net loss of people through 
international migration (10,400) was almost as large as 
the contribution made by natural increase (11,170) (Table 
2). In most of the countries listed in this sub ‑region the 
net out ‑migration rate per 1000 population was over 10 
compared with rates of 1.2 for Micronesia and 0.6 for 
Melanesia. Polynesian populations are much more heavi‑
ly impacted by migration than most of those in Microne‑
sia and all of those in Melanesia (Table 2).
Another perspective on this variability in contempora‑
ry migration rates is reflected in Figure 3 which shows 
comparative out ‑migration rates for the independent 
states in the region.
The countries in western Melanesia have very low rates 
of emigration by comparison with the independent 
countries in the eastern and northern Pacific, as well 
as their Melanesian neighbour, Fiji. Substantial labour 
migration from Fiji to New Zealand and Australia has 
taken place from the 1950s, and there were formal work 
permit schemes with New Zealand from the mid‑1970s 
until 1987 (Bedford, 2008; Bedford and Hugo, 2012). 
There has also been extensive migration of teachers, 
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Sub-region/country Natural Net Population Net migration
increase migration growth rate/000 pop
Melanesia 201,390 ‑4,340 197,050 ‑0.4
Fiji 9,120 ‑5,270 3,850 ‑6.1
New Caledonia 2,400 900 3,300 3.5
Papua New Guinea 168,210 50 168,260 0.0
Solomon Islands 15,220 ‑10 15,210 0.0
Vanuatu 6,440 ‑10 6,430 0.0
Micronesia 8,770 ‑630 8,140 ‑1.2
Federated States (FSM) 1,910 ‑1,900 10 ‑18.5
Guam 2,160 2,400 4,560 13.7
Kiribati 2,330 ‑100 2,230 ‑1.0
Marshall Islands 1,370 ‑930 440 ‑17.5
Nauru 280 ‑100 180 ‑9.9
Nthern Mariana Islands 630 10 640 0.2
Palau 90 ‑10 80 ‑0.6
Polynesia 11,170 ‑10,400 770 ‑16.0
American Samoa 1,190 ‑800 390 ‑14.2
Cook Islands 160 ‑100 60 ‑6.6
French Polynesia 2,950 ‑2,810 140 ‑10.8
Niue 10 ‑40 ‑30 ‑26.7
Samoa 4,530 ‑4,500 30 ‑24.0
Tokelau 10 ‑20 ‑10 ‑16.7
Tonga 2,090 ‑2,000 90 ‑19.4
Tuvalu 170 ‑30 140 ‑2.7
Wallis and Futuna 60 ‑100 ‑40 ‑8.3
Pacific Islands 221,330 ‑15,370 205,960 ‑1.4
Table 2: Components of Population Growth, July 2012‑June 2013
Note: Some minor amendments have been made to the net migration estimates for countries given zero net migration in the SPC’s Population 
Data Sheet, 2013.
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nurses, security personnel, entrepreneurs and other 
skilled Fijians and Fiji Indians to other Pacific countries 
as well as to countries on the Pacific Rim (Voigt ‑Graf et 
al, 2007).
The small diaspora of Papua New Guineans, Solomon 
Islanders and Ni ‑Vanuatu has significant secondary 
consequences for mobility in that there are very small 
proportions of people overseas with the familial links to 
provide either the necessary sponsorship and/or financi‑
al support to enable migration under family reunion 
categories, where they exist, or as visitors. Yet, it is these 
countries where, according to recent estimates from 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, the largest 
population growth is expected to occur in coming de‑
cades (Table 3). According to these projections, Mela‑
nesia’s population could double again by 2050 (from 
9,848,100 in 2013, to 18,726,600 in 2050). By comparis‑
on, the population of Micronesia is projected to incre‑
ase by around 38 percent over the same period (from 
515,300 to 711,300) while Polynesia’s population may 
only increase by 20 percent (from 649,500 in 2010 to 
782,700 in 2050) (Table 3). Ninety ‑six percent of the pro‑
jected population increase of 9.2 million in the Pacific 
between 2013 and 2050 is likely to be found in Melanesia 
and it is only in the three countries of western Melanesia 
and in Kiribati in Micronesia that growth in excess of 40 
percent is forecast for each of the two periods shown in 
Table 3: 2013‑2030 and 2030‑2050.
With limited opportunities for international migrati‑
on for Papua New Guineans, Solomon Islanders and 
Ni ‑Vanuatu the Pacific region is faced with on ‑going 
growth in the share of its population which has fewer 
options than some other Pacific populations in re‑
sponding to environmental stressors by undertaking 
some form of voluntary adaptive migration overseas. In 
contrast to their Melanesian counterparts, Micronesian 
and Polynesian populations have greater opportunity 
for international migration. As will be seen below, most 
countries have constitutional arrangements or specific 
agreements with countries on the Pacific Rim or in 
Europe that allow for international migration of a short‑
‑term, long ‑term or permanent nature.
Finally, the increasing role of China in the context of 
evolving Pacific migration futures must be acknowled‑
ged. While there have been small Chinese diaspora in 
several Pacific countries since the 19th century (Willmott, 
1995), the 21st century has seen a significant increase in 
the regional economic and social presence of Chinese 
citizens, and the Chinese state (Crocombe, 2007). There 
are signs that, in some countries, this is leading to social 
tensions at a local level (Banga, 2013) as well as causing 
tension at a geo ‑political level as China and the United 
States vie for regional influence in the ‘Pacific century’12. 
While increasing geo ‑political competition could signifi‑
cantly impact on regional migration patterns by opening 
up new destinations, it is not yet clear if and how this will 
manifest (International Migration Institute, 2013: 16).
Figure 3: Pacific Migration Rates (per 1000 population) around 2006 and Major Destinations for Migrants  
(Gibson and Nero, 2008)
12 See here op ‑ed by Hilary Clinton ‘America’s Pacific Century’ Foreign Policy (October 2011)
22 TECHNICAL PAPER
Sub-region/country Estimated population Percentage change
 2013 2030 2050 2013–30 2030–50
Melanesia 9,848,100 13,629,900 18,726,600 38.4 37.4
Fiji 859,200 936,200 1,026,700 9.0 9.7
New Caledonia 259,000 310,900 343,200 20.0 10.4
Papua New Guinea 7,854,400 11,100,000 15,520,000 41.3 39.8
Solomon Islands 610,800 912,400 1,353,700 49.4 48.4
Vanuatu 264,700 370,400 483,000 39.9 30.4
Micronesia 515,300 618,000 711,300 19.9 15.1
Federated States (FSM) 102,800 97,900 97,300 ‑4.8 ‑0.6
Guam 174,900 214,800 233,500 22.8 8.7
Kiribati 103,100 149,800 208,000 45.3 38.9
Marshall Islands 53,100 58,700 70,700 10.5 20.4
Nauru 10,100 13,700 17,100 35.6 24.8
Nthern Mariana Islands 53,900 64,500 66,700 19.7 3.4
Palau 17,400 18,600 18,000 6.9 ‑3.2
Polynesia 649,500 670,900 782,700 3.3 16.7
American Samoa 56,500 62,800 82,200 11.2 30.9
Cook Islands 15,200 16,000 16,000 5.3 0.0
French Polynesia 261,300 292,800 316,900 12.1 8.2
Niue 1,500 1,300 1,300 ‑13.3 0.0
Samoa 187,400 191,100 238,200 2.0 24.6
Tokelau 1,200 1,000 900 ‑16.7 ‑10.0
Tonga 103,300 105,900 127,200 2.5 20.1
Tuvalu 11,000 14,400 19,700 30.9 36.8
Wallis and Futuna 12,100 12,000 12,100 ‑0.8 0.8
Pacific Islands 11,012,900 14,918,800 20,220,600 35.5 35.5
Table 3: Population Change, 2013–2050
Data source: SPC Population Data Sheet, 2013, http://www.spc.int/sdd/
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13 Written laws were introduced in Tonga in 1850 and 1860, followed by a written constitution in 1865. Written constitutions along with written 
laws were issued in Fiji in 1867, 1871 and 1873. Written laws were issued in Niue in 1876 and 1in the 1880s in Samoa.
14 Lieber (1977), Campbell (1984, 2006, 2010) and Barnett and Campbell (2010) all contain reviews of community relocation as one response 
to natural (and human ‑induced) disasters. See also, Tabucanon (2012) and McAdam ‘Caught Between Homelands’ Inside Story (15 March 
2013 available at www. inside.org.au, accessed 6 December 2013).
15 See here Knudsen (1977).
3.4 REGULATION OF MIGRATION IN 
THE PACIFIC: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
While movement between places in the pre ‑colonial 
Pacific was not constrained by boundaries of the kind 
that accompanied the formation of colonies and later in‑
dependent nation states, entry into territory occupied by 
another group was subject to negotiation and access was 
not always granted. If approval to enter was granted, us‑
age of host group territory was restricted. But the rules 
and practices regarding support for people in neighbou‑
ring islands or other parts of the region that had been 
affected by natural disaster were very different from 
the situation which exists today. In pre ‑colonial times, 
social affairs, including who had access to group terri‑
tory, were regulated by traditional custom and practice, 
not written laws. Within these governance structures, 
arrangements for assistance and co ‑operation between 
communities in times of emergency developed (Cam‑
pbell, 1984, 2006; Corrin and Paterson, 2011).
Beginning in the mid‑19th century, and with the assis‑
tance of European missionaries and businessmen who 
had increasingly began to settle in the region, a number 
of imperial regimes began to emerge (not all colonial) 
and with these came the beginning of written agree‑
ments and laws (Corrin and Paterson, 2011; Craig et al., 
2014)13. Also, as early as 1872, the British Crown was 
enacting legislation outlawing “criminal outrages by 
British subjects upon natives of islands in the Pacific 
Ocean”, essentially to deal with ‘blackbirding’ – the 
kidnapping of island labour for work initially in mines 
in South America (Maude, 1981) and later for work on 
plantations in Australia (Corris, 1973).
During the first half of the 20th century, the movement 
of Pacific indigenous peoples into the small towns that 
evolved to serve mainly the trading companies and 
the colonial administrations was restricted by a range 
of Native Regulations designed to keep local people in 
their villages, working their lands to cover their subsis‑
tence needs as well as to generate a surplus for payment 
of head taxes in cash or kind. These restrictions on 
movement to urban areas applied throughout Mela‑
nesia until the Second World War (Brookfield, 1972). 
There were also restrictions on long ‑distance sea travel 
in sailing canoes, partly because of the perceived risk, 
by colonial administrators, of groups being lost at sea 
(Bayliss ‑Smith et al., 1988).
The emergence of more centralised forms of whole ‑of‑
‑island government tended not, however, to impact upon 
long ‑established practices for the provision of mutual 
assistance and cooperation during emergencies including 
in the wake of natural disasters. Bayliss ‑Smith et al (1988, 
141) observed in relation to the eastern islands of Fiji:
[A]lthough there was potential for hurricane dam‑
age to gardens and houses in pre ‑colonial Kabara, 
food stress was not necessarily great and losses were 
shared. Intra‑ and inter ‑community co ‑operation 
were clearly key factors in the rehabilitation of areas 
affected by extreme physical events. Complex chains 
of dependency relationships linked communities and 
islands throughout pre ‑colonial Fiji; relationships 
which could be exploited in different ways depending 
on circumstances.
Indeed, in the context of community relocation as a me‑
ans of adapting to natural disasters, the establishment of 
colonial administrations in the region had an enabling 
rather than restricting effect. In 1907, as a result of the 
devastation of Woleai by a typhoon, approximately 300 
persons were relocated from Woleai (in the modern 
Federated States of Micronesia) to Saipan (now in the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) 
where they founded a new settlement with the help of 
the German colonial administration. In the same year, 
approximately 400 people were also brought from the 
Mortlock atolls to Saipan (Spennemann, 2007). Nu‑
merous examples of community relocation to address 
environmental change linked with natural (e.g. drought) 
as well as human (e.g. mining) impacts can be found in 
the recent history of the Pacific14. Most of these reloca‑
tions involved internal displacement of communities 
within their countries, although where colonial powers 
administered several different territories, international 
movements also occurred.
The Western Pacific High Commission covered the 
Protectorates established in the Solomon Islands and 
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in the 1890s, Fiji (its 
headquarters for many years) and, with varying degrees 
of authority, Tonga, Pitcairn and the Tokelaus and Cook 
Islands (until they came under New Zealand control). It 
was largely because of the common jurisdiction under 
the Western Pacific High Commission that I ‑Kiribati 
could be resettled relatively easily in Fiji (Rabi) to enable 
the further phosphate mining of their home island of 
Banaba, and in the Solomon Islands (Gizo and Wagina) 
following persistent drought in the Phoenix Islands15. 
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16 The Vaitupuans were granted entry by the Fiji’s colonial government under an open admissions policy that ended in 1959. Some 40 of the 
settlers had returned to Vaitupu by the late 1970s. It was found that there were no regulations in existence covering the rights of re ‑entry of 
the returnees (Koch, 1978:97).
This colonial administrative arrangement also allowed 
the Vaitupuans in Tuvalu to purchase the island of Kioa 
in Fiji in the late 1940s as a hedge against future popu‑
lation pressure on their home island, although in this 
case, regulation of the migration process did not always 
proceed smoothly16. Once these countries became inde‑
pendent, it was not nearly so easy for people to be reloca‑
ted across international borders (Campbell, 2010).
In the past ten years, a number of Pacific countries have 
up ‑dated their immigration laws, including Fiji (2003), 
Samoa (2004), New Zealand (2009), Vanuatu (2010), 
Niue (2011) and the Solomon Islands (2012). The Cook 
Islands is presently reviewing its immigration legis‑
lation, which dates from the early 1970s. At the 2012 
Conference of Pacific Immigration Directors, the Cook 
Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration 
remarked:
The Cook Islands immigration law that is currently in 
operation today is the Entry, Residence and Departu‑
res Act 1971‑72 that was designed for the circumstan‑
ces of the early 1970s when the Cook Islands’ only 
access to the world (apart from Radio Cook Islands) 
was via the 1960 New Zealand government built pa‑
ssenger and cargo vessel, Moana Roa, visiting tourist 
boats, yachts and the monthly Solent flying boats 
operated by Tasman Empire Airways Limited (TEAL) 
the forerunner of Air New Zealand. The Rarotonga 
International Airport was still being built…
One thing is clear however and that is the 1971‑72 
immigration legislation is clearly inadequate to meet 
the challenges of the 21st century.
Despite this general trend towards reviewing and upda‑
ting national immigration law, other Pacific countries 
continue to apply legislation and/or regulations framed 
some decades ago such as Kiribati (1991) and Papua New 
Guinea (1978/9) (see Appendix 1 which lists the legislati‑
on consulted during the preparation of this report).
Clusters and Hubs: Toward a Regional Architecture for Voluntary Adaptive Migration in The Pacific 25
The colonisation process in the Pacific, which did not end until the 1970s for large parts of the region, 
had a profound affect on regional mobility. To this can be added the mandate and trusteeship systems 
developed by the League of Nations and United Nations in the aftermath of World Wars One and Two. 
These systems respectively gave legal control over the affairs of various Pacific Islands to New Zealand 
and the United States. The twin processes of colonisation and trusteeship have provided the foundation 
for sub -regional ‘clusters’ of states within which the cluster members have varying levels of privileged ac-
cess to temporary or permanent residence in the former colonial, mandate or trustee state which typical-
ly acts as a cluster ‘hub’. Over time, more clusters have emerged as developments of, or counterpoints to, 
these colonial clusters. The effect of clustering has been to greatly enhance the capacity for cross -border 
mobility overall, albeit in different ways. In order to better understand the variable effect of clustering 
on regional mobility, it is necessary to chart some of the ways by which the different island countries and 
territories have become members of one or more clusters.
In this section we discuss two groups of clusters: those that were basically established during the era of 
colonial rule and those that have emerged since the island states became independent. The main clusters 
established during the colonial era are shown in Figure 4, while some of those that have emerged in the 
post -colonial era are shown in Figure 5. Not all of the clusters that might be defined are included in this 
report (for example we only mention in passing the annual Micronesian Chief Executives Summit and 
the very recently formed Polynesian Leaders Group) but the maps and the discussion that follows detail 
the major features of the current arrangements that provide the essential architecture for exploring ave-
nues and possibilities for contemporary voluntary adaptive migration within the region.
4. CLUSTERS AND HUBS: THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF PACIFIC ISLAND 
MOBILITY
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17 An Imperial Order in Council was issued under the Colonial Boundaries Act 1895 (UK), and corresponding Proclamations issued in Auckland 
on 10 and 13 June 1901 formally applied the Imperial Order in Council on 11 June 1901. For an excellent overview of the legal origins of the 
New Zealand cluster, see Ministry of Justice (2000).
4.1 THE NEW ZEALAND CLUSTER
4.1.1 Origins
The legal origins of the New Zealand cluster (Figure 
4) trace from the turn of the 20th century. In 1901 the 
boundary of the Colony of New Zealand was extended 
to include what is now the Cook Islands and Niue17. 
From this time until the coming into force of the Cook 
Islands Constitution Act 1964 (NZ), and the Niue Con‑
stitution Act 1974 (NZ), both the Cook Islands and Niue 
were part of New Zealand.
Following the outbreak of World War 1, the New Zea‑
land Government seized from the German authorities 
what is now Samoa (formally Western Samoa). After the 
war a League of Nations Mandate was conferred em‑
powering the New Zealand Parliament to make laws for 
the ‘peace, order, and good government of the Territory 
of Western Samoa.’ This resulted in the Samoa Act 1921, 
which provided the constitutional framework for the 
Figure 4: Established Population Mobility Clusters
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legal system of Western Samoa until independence in 
1962 (Ministry of Justice, 2000:21).
The three Pacific atolls of Atafu, Nukunono, and Faka‑
ofo, which comprise the Tokelau Islands, were made 
a British protectorate in 1889 and became part of the 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony in 1916. By delegated 
authority, they were governed by the Administrator of 
Western Samoa from 1926, and from 1 January 1949 
were, by effect of the Tokelau Act 1948 (NZ), declared to 
form part of New Zealand. They remain a New Zealand 
colony.
4.1.2 Mobility in the New Zealand cluster
There are several tiers to the relationships between New 
Zealand and the Pacific island countries which form 
part of its cluster. These tiers are reflected in New Zea‑
land’s immigration law and they produce varying levels 
of opportunity for cross ‑border movement between the 
members of the cluster and its hub.
Tier 1: Citizenship
Occupying the first tier are Pacific islands that are in 
a form of constitutional relationship with New Zealand 
which confers New Zealand citizenship on their nation‑
als. Both the Cook Islands and Niue exist in free associa‑
tion with New Zealand and the constitutions of both 
counties vest full law ‑making powers in their respective 
legislatures. Nevertheless, Clause 1 of the 1983 Letters 
Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor General 
of New Zealand relevantly declares the realm of NZ to 
include New Zealand, the „self ‑governing“ states of the 
Cook Islands and Niue, and theTokelau Islands18. The 
constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue also explicit‑
ly preserve New Zealand citizenship status19.
These constitutional ties are reflected in the New 
Zealand Citizenship Act 1977. There has been some 
tightening of provisions relating to access to citizen‑
ship in recent years, however. Until end of 2005, most 
children born in the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tolekau 
Islands were automatically NZ citizens at birth and 
had unfettered rights of entry and stay in New Zea‑
land under immigration legislation. However, from 1 
January 2006, only children who had at least one parent 
who was a New Zealand citizen, and who was entitled 
to reside indefinitely in the Cook Islands, Niue or the 
Tokelau Islands, were citizens of New Zealand by birth. 
The significance of this privileged citizenship provision 
in terms of mobility is that under the Immigration Act 
2009 all New Zealand citizens are lawfully able to enter 
and reside in the country at any time and for as long as 
they wish. Under the Trans ‑Tasman Travel Agreement 
New Zealand citizens can also enter Australia and reside 
for as long as they wish there without obtaining visas in 
advance.
As regards movement of New Zealanders to tier one 
cluster islands, there is partial privileging. Niuean 
immigration law provides that every New Zealand 
citizen born in Niue has the right to travel to and 
remain in Niue at any time. New Zealand citizens with 
a parent who is also a New Zealand citizen but born in, 
or a permanent resident of Niue, can apply to remain 
lawfully in Niue. The person is deemed to be born in 
Niue for the purposes of the right of entry and stay 
under Niue’s immigration law20. Other New Zealanders 
are granted a 30‑day visitors permit on arrival21. In the 
Cook Islands, New Zealand citizens travelling on New 
Zealand passports are exempt from obtaining an entry 
permit if their stay is for fewer than 90 days. Persons 
from the Tokelau Islands or Niue travelling on New 
Zealand passports will also qualify for these exempti‑
ons. Other special arrangements exist for New Zealand 
pensioners22.
Tier 2: Permanent residence via a special quota
Occupying a second tier in the New Zealand cluster is 
Samoa which, as reflected in the 1962 Treaty of Friend‑
ship signed at the time of independence, has a special in‑
ternational relationship with New Zealand. This special 
relationship is reflected in New Zealand immigration 
policy which, since 1970, has contained a Samoan Quota 
Scheme23. This allows up to 1,100 Samoan citizens a year 
to be granted rights to permanent residence in New 
Zealand. In the early 1980s, there was a successful legal 
challenge in the Privy Council regarding citizenship ri‑
ghts for Samoans born before 1947 when a separate New 
Zealand citizenship was first mandated (Macdonald, 
1986). As part of a negotiated settlement to this case, 
a Protocol to the Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1982 
under which New Zealand has a specific obligation to 
consult Samoa on immigration (and citizenship) matters 
affecting Samoa.
Also sitting in this second tier are Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Kiribati. New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category (PAC), 
which was introduced in 2002, allows 250 citizens of 
18 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor General of New Zealand (S.R 1983/225). Available at: 
www.cabinetmanual.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/appendix ‑a (accessed 27 October 2013)
19 See section 6 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 (NZ); section 5 Niue Constitution Act 1974 (NZ).
20 Section 5, Immigration Act 2011
21 Section 4 of the Niue Immigration Act 2011
22 http://www.mfai.gov.ck/index.php/immigration/visitors.html (accessed 1 October 2013)
23 See INZ Operational Manual at S.1.10 (effective 1 April 2013)
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Tonga, 75 citizens of Tuvalu, and 75 citizens of Kiribati 
to be granted residence visas each year. The total num‑
ber of individuals approved under all these categories 
includes principal applicants, their partners, and depen‑
dent children. Selection criteria include: that principal 
applicants are aged between 18‑45 years, that the generic 
immigration health and character requirements are met, 
and that the principal applicant or his/her spouse has 
an acceptable offer of employment in New Zealand. The 
PAC replaced existing arrangements with these count‑
ries including the visa ‑waiver entry privilege granted to 
citizens of Kiribati and Tuvalu in 1986, and the tempo‑
rary work permits schemes that had been in place for 
Tongans since the mid‑1970s and with Tuvaluans and 
I ‑Kiribati since the early 1990s (Bedford, 2008)24.
Tier 3: special temporary employment privileges
Occupying a third tier are those Pacific countries which 
have been selected to be ‘kick ‑start’ states under New 
Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) sche‑
me, a managed circular migration policy introduced in 
2007 to provide seasonal labour to the horticulture and 
viticulture industries (Ramasamy et al., 2008; Bedford 
(C.E.) 2013). Approved (recognised) employers in New 
Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture industries are 
granted permission to recruit (an ATR or Agreement 
to Recruit) workers from member states of the Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF). Although citizens of all PIF states 
are able to be offered employment under the scheme, 
the citizens of certain Pacific counties have been pri‑
vileged in that New Zealand’s Department of Labour 
entered into Inter ‑Agency Understandings with their 
counterparts in these countries to facilitate the effective 
recruitment, pre ‑travel preparation and orientation, and 
in ‑country pastoral care of workers (Ramasamy et al., 
2008; Bedford (C.E.) 2013). The initial kick ‑start states 
were Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, with 
the Solomon Islands added in 2010 and Papua New 
Guinea in 2013.
Selection of Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati and Tuvalu reflected 
long ‑standing special relationships which have been ex‑
pressed in New Zealand’s immigration laws via seasonal 
work and other policies since the 1960s. Vanuatu was 
added to ensure representation of at least one Melanesi‑
an country in the scheme in recognition of the fact that 
one of the key objectives of the policy was to encourage 
“economic development, regional integration and good 
governance within the Pacific”25. Engagement with at 
least one state in the western Pacific with which New 
Zealand had no previous privileged mobility arrange‑
ments, as well as with states in Micronesia (Kiribati) and 
Polynesia (Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu) that New Zealand 
has previously assisted, was a significant development 
in immigration policy. In the four seasons between 
April 2007 and July 2011 the RSE work policy facilitated 
the temporary entry of at least 15,000 Pacific workers 
into New Zealand, with over half of these coming from 
Vanuatu (Bedford and Hugo, 2012: 64; Bedford (C.E.), 
2013).
By 2013, New Zealand had opened up a channel for tem‑
porary seasonal labour migration for citizens of three 
countries in Melanesia (Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu) with which it had previously not 
had formal migration links, aside from study visas for 
scholarship students. A New Zealand employer, who is 
registered as a Recognised Seasonal Employer, and has 
been granted an Agreement to Recruit labour from the 
Pacific for a particular season, can receive assistance 
with recruitment, as directed under the conditions of 
Inter ‑Agency Understandings, in three countries in 
Melanesia, three in Polynesia and one in Micronesia. If 
they wish to recruit from other countries in Micronesia 
that are members of the Pacific Forum (such as Nauru, 
Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands) 
they can, but their recruitment will not be facilitated by 
specific agreements between Ministries responsible for 
overseeing labour in New Zealand and the Pacific26.
The third tier in New Zealand’s cluster thus spans 
the independent states of the Pacific and is the most 
inclusive of any of the cluster arrangements regarding 
mobility. However, an important point often overlooked 
in discussions about leveraging the RSE scheme in the 
context of climate change is that it is not possible for 
Pacific citizens from any of these states to travel to New 
Zealand independently and become a seasonal worker 
under the RSE scheme. Workers need to be recruited by 
New Zealand employers and the scheme is completely 
demand ‑driven from the hub. Also, it is not possible for 
RSE workers to transition to residence from their short‑
‑term special purpose work visas (Bedford (C.E.), 2013).
24 New Zealand also had work permit schemes with Fiji dating back to the 1960s but these were terminated following the first military 
coup d’etat in Fiji in 1987. Fiji was included in the PAC when it was introduced in 2002 with a quota of 250 citizens, like Tonga. But this 
arrangement ceased after the 2006 military coup.
25 See INZ Operational Manual at WH1. 1. 1.c (effective 29 November 2010). Fiji was also included as a kick start state when the scheme was 
initially scoped, but their access was put on hold as part of the New Zealand government’s sanctions following the military coup d’etat in 
December 2006.
26 A small number of Nauruans were recruited as RSE workers in 2007 but this arrangement was short ‑lived. In the 2013/14 season the North 
Island Relationship Manager for the RSE Unit will attempt will be made to find an RSE employer to recruit a small number of Nauruans 
(George Rarere, pers comm, 24 October 2013).
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4.2 THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (US) CLUSTER
4.2.1 Origins
The legal origins of a cluster focused on the United Sta‑
tes of America (Figure 4) can be traced to 1898 with the 
ceding of Guam to the United States by treaty at the end 
of the Spanish ‑American War. What is now American 
Samoa was added in 1929 after renunciation by Great 
Britain and Germany of their claims, and the cession of 
these islands by the Samoan chiefs to the United States27. 
The remainder of the cluster linked with the United 
States after World War II when the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands (TTPI), comprising the Marshall Islands, 
the Northern Mariana Islands and the Caroline Islands 
(Figure 1), emerged as one of the 11 trust territories 
administered under the U.N. Trusteeship system. The 
United States negotiated a trusteeship agreement with 
the United Nations for giving it administrative control28.
Following a recommendation in 1969 by the Microne‑
sian Future Political Status Commission that the TTPI 
be constituted as a self ‑governing free state and able to 
negotiate entry into free association with the United 
States, the TTPI fragmented. The Northern Mariana 
group rejected this proposal, electing instead to become 
a commonwealth under US sovereignty. Ultimately, 
a covenant between the United States and the Northern 
Marianas was entered into formalising this arrange‑
ment29. The remaining two island chains split further 
into the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and Palau. These 
states have all entered into Compacts of Free Associ‑
ation with the United States, under which the United 
States is given full authority for matters relating to their 
defence and security in return for financial and other 
assistance including preferential rights admission to the 
United States for their nationals.
4.2.2 Mobility in The USA Cluster
In common with the arrangements described for the 
New Zealand cluster, the relationships between the 
United States and the Pacific countries and territories 
within the USA cluster also translate into a three ‑tiered 
hierarchy which associated variations in rights of entry 
and stay.
Tier 1: Citizenship
The first tier is occupied by those territories whose 
residents are entitled to American (US) citizenship. 
Under law in the United States of America, citizenship 
can be derived from either the 14th amendment of the 
US Constitution30 or from a specific statute conferring 
citizenship on inhabitants of a territory, which, althou‑
gh not a state of the Union, is under the sovereignty of 
the United States of America. Such legislation has been 
enacted for the inhabitants of Guam31, and the Com‑
monwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)32. 
As citizens, inhabitants of Guam and CNMI are able 
to enter and work in the USA freely, and enjoy many 
of the rights of citizenship33. The special status of these 
relations is reflected Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), which defines ‚United States‘ as including not just 
the continental United States but also including Hawai’i, 
Puerto Rico, Guam and the CNMI.
Tier 2: Nationality but not citizenship
Guam and the CNMI are each defined as ‘States’ under 
the INA34 and stand in contrast to American Samoa in 
respect of which no statute conferring citizenship has 
been entered into. Consequently American Samoa is 
defined under the INA35 as an ‘outlying possession‘ of 
the United States which constitutes a second tier relati‑
onship. The effect is that persons born to non ‑US citizen 
parents in an outlying possession are nationals but 
not US citizens at birth36. While they able to enter the 
United States of America at will, the rights attaching to 
citizenship only in the USA do not apply in their case37.
27 Convention in Respect to the Samoan Group of Islands, Dec. 2, 1899, 31 Stat. 1878 (1900); Act of February 20, 1929, ch. 281, 45 Stat. 1253 
(1929), 48 U.S.C. § 1661.
28 See Armstrong, (1979), cited in Dema (2012).
29 Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, approved by 
Pub. L. No. 94‑241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976), 48 U.S.C. § 1801.
30 Under which all persons born or naturalised in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are US citizens.
31 Section 307 Immigration and Nationality Act INA; 8 U.S.C. s1407.
32 Covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America (48 U.S.C. s 303 
as approved by Congress, 8 U.S. 1408).
33 US General Accounting Office (1997: 9) notes that some rights relating to voting do not apply in the insular areas.
34 Section 101(a) (36) and (38).
35 Section 101(a)(29)
36 Section 308(1).
37 Presently, a legal challenge is being mounted arguing that such a distinction is unlawful. A Federal Court in Washington DC has recently 
dismissed the appeal; see Tuaua v US Civil Action12‑1433 (RJL); Fili Sagapolutele “American Samoans have no right to US citizenship, US 
court concludes” Pacific Scoop (28 June 2013). www.pacific.scoop.co.nz (accessed 12 September 2013).
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Tier 3: Visa ‑waiver and access to em‑
ployment in the USA
Occupying a third tier in the US cluster are the Fe‑
derated States Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands (RMI) and Palau, which have each 
entered into Compacts of Free Association (CFA) with 
the United States. Broadly, citizens of the CFA states by 
birth, and certain categories of citizens by naturalisation 
or their relatives, enjoy privileged rights of entry into 
USA. They do not require entry visas, and are exempt 
from the employment provisions of the INA.
Significant concerns emerged during the renegotiations 
of the CFA during the early 2000s over the impact CFA 
migration was having on State budgets in places such as 
Guam, Hawaii and the CNMI, to where the majority of 
Compact migrants travelled. By 1998, more than 13,000 
FSM and RMI citizens had made use of the CFA to enter 
Guam, Hawaii and the CNMI as ‘non immigrants’. Non‑
‑immigrant impact assessments prepared by the three 
State governments for the year 2000 estimated the total 
cost to their budgets of such movement to be $58.2 milli‑
on. In that year, Guam received $7.58 million in impact 
funding, while the other two areas received no funding 
(US General Accounting Office, 2003: 6).
The amended CFAs now contain new provisions im‑
posing restrictions and expressly applying the INA to 
Compact migrants38. Although the right of entry and 
access to the labour market remains undisturbed, other 
provisions of the INA, including those upon which 
admission can be denied or legal stay brought to an end, 
remain operative39. Further, entry and stay is neither au‑
tomatic nor guaranteed. Once admitted, if a CFA State 
citizen subsequently becomes unable to show they have 
sufficient means to support themselves, they are liable 
to deportation. Admissions under the CFA agreements 
do not confer status as a lawful permanent resident 
(green ‑card holder). Nor does admission confer residen‑
ce necessary for naturalisation under the INA. While 
a person admitted under the CFA provisions can apply 
for residence or naturalisation, no special rules apply, 
and the period of time admitted under the CFA does 
not count towards the five years of lawful permanent 
residence required for naturalisation40.
4. 2. 3 Movement between Cluster Members
While the CFAs in relation to Palau, the RMI, and 
FSM allow free movement between these states and the 
United States of America, which includes Guam and the 
CNMI, they do not regulate admission between the CFA 
states. An interesting feature of the American cluster is 
that, despite this, there is a mutual privileging of entry 
and stay at this tier in the cluster. For example, the FSM 
code41 makes special arrangements for citizens and na‑
tionals of the United States of America, and citizens and 
nationals of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the 
Republic of Palau, who may be issued a visitors permit 
for up to 365 days, compared to the 30 days for other 
non ‑citizens. In the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
US citizens and citizens of Palau and the Federated 
States of Micronesia do not need a visa to enter42 and are 
also exempt from requirement to hold a work permit43. 
In Palau, while entry visas are not generally required 
and a 30‑day tourist visa will be issued, special arrange‑
ments exist for citizens of the United States of America, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands, Guam, and the Commonwealth 
of Northern Marianas Islands who are issued 1 year 
visas upon arrival44. It should also be noted that U.S. 
citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) who 
travel directly between parts of the United States, which 
includes, for this purpose, insular possessions such as 
Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), without touching 
at a foreign port or place, are not required to present 
a valid U.S. Passport or U.S. Green Card45.
American Samoa has special provisions46 for Ame‑
rican citizens by allowing entry with possession of 
valid passport or other identity production and proof 
of onward ticket, or poof of employment, without the 
need to have fingerprints or a photograph of the holder. 
Otherwise, entry requirements for CFA nationals into 
American Samoa are the same as for other non ‑citizens 
wishing to enter as visitors.
38 The amended Compacts were signed into law under the CFA Amendment Act 2003.
39 The CFA agreement in relation to the FSM and RMI are explicit in this regard. Although the agreement with Palau does not expressly incorporate 
the other sections of the INA, these provisos remain applicable for the Department of Homeland Security which is the agency charged with 
the administration of the INS (see USCIS Fact Sheet (2008) Status Of The Citizens Of The Freely Associated States Of The Federated States Of 
Micronesia And The Republic Of The Marshall Islands; USCIS Fact Sheet (2008) Status of the Citizens of the Republic of Palau.)
40 Dema (2012:186‑189); Compact of Free Association Amendment Act 2003 sections 141(d) and (f).
41 FSM Code, Title 50, Section 103(1).
42 Immigration Act 2006, sections 13(1)(c) and 13 (1)(d).
43 Labour (Non ‑Resident Workers Act) 2006, sections 10(2)(c) and 10(2)(d).
44 Website of Palau Visitors authority.
45 See 8 C.F.R section 215 (e), (g)(h); see also: http://goo.gl/NWEGrK
46 Code of American Samoa, Title 41, Section 41.502(1)
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4.3 THE FRENCH CLUSTER
4.3.1 Origins
The French took control of what is now Tahiti in 
1842, and several other island groups near Tahiti were 
annexed in the 1880s. The islands were constituted 
as French Polynesia and in 1857 they became a terri‑
tory of France. Wallis and Futuna became a French 
Protectorate in 1887 and a territory of France in 1961. 
New Caledonia was seized in 1853 and has become the 
anchor of the French colonies in the Pacific with its 
rich nickel deposits and extensive mining industry. The 
neighbouring islands, currently known as Vanuatu, 
were jointly administered as the Condominium of the 
New Hebrides by France and Britain between 1906 and 
1980 after twenty years of collaboration via a Joint Naval 
Commission to protect the lives and interests of their 
respective citizens (Crocombe 2001). Of these French 
colonial possessions, New Caledonia has the most 
troubled history with a long ‑standing campaign by the 
indigenous Kanak population for independence spilling 
over into political violence from time ‑to ‑time.
Immigration into the territories that comprise the 
French cluster (Figure 4) is generally controlled by Fran‑
ce. The situation in New Caledonia is more complex in 
light of the governance arrangements under the Nou‑
mea Accord (1998) and 1999 Organic Law47. The Accord 
transferred a number of powers to the New Caledonia 
Executive, including powers relating to the provision of 
special guarantees for the employment rights of local 
inhabitants and the reinforcement of regulations re‑
garding non ‑residents48. Also, under the shared powers 
arrangements, the New Caledonia Executive is to be 
“associated with the implementation” of rules relating to 
the entry and stay of foreigners49. This is reflected in the 
Organic Law, which explicitly preserves control by the 
French state over immigration but with an obligation 
on the High Commissioner in Noumea to consult the 
local government on visas for entry and stay of more 
than three months50. These arrangements, whereby the 
New Caledonia Executive considers work permits on 
a case ‑by ‑case basis, provides for an unwieldy and rather 
opaque system for controlling entry and stay beyond 
that for short ‑term visitors (Fisher, 2013: 122).
4.3.2 Mobility in the French cluster
The French approach to colonial administration in the 
South Pacific differed from the British approach in 
a number of ways, the most significant of which, for pre‑
sent purposes, was the installation of a system of direct 
rule by French officials appointed by the French Go‑
vernment (Crocombe, 2001). One legacy of the French 
approach is an emphasis on the ‘indivisibility’ of French 
citizenship, which means that nationals of New Caledo‑
nia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna are citizens 
of France with full rights to access to metropolitan 
France itself. As French citizens, they also are members 
of the European Union with the same mobility rights 
within the Union as any other French citizen. This tier 
one status also has allowed significant migration into 
New Caledonia, in particular of French citizens who, 
according to the 2009 census, were estimated to com‑
prise nearly 30% of the total population. Conscious of 
the implications arising from the right to free movement 
enjoyed by EU citizens, France negotiated exemptions to 
the Schengen Agreement for its overseas territories, and 
in both New Caledonia and French Polynesia the provi‑
sions of local employment protection laws are permitted 
(Fisher, 2013: 218‑219).
In terms of international migration, New Caledonia is 
by far the most significant of the three French territories 
and immigration is a particularly sensitive issue. Attrac‑
ted by employment opportunities in the cluster’s largest 
regional economy, there has been a large and steady 
flow of migrants from French Polynesia and particularly 
Wallis and Futuna to New Caledonia (Crocombe 2001; 
Fisher 2013)51. The introduction of new categories of 
ethnic groups such as ‘mixed ‑race’ into the 2009 census 
in New Caledonia, and subsequent reallocation of this 
group to the declared Kanak, European and Wallisian 
populations, revealed that the Wallisian populati‑
on’s share of the total increased from 9% in 1996 to 
10.4% in 2009. Those from French Polynesia comprised 
an estimated 2% in 2009. The influx of Wallisians is 
a sensitive issue that has given rise to tensions which, 
from time ‑to ‑time, have spilled over into inter‑
‑communal violence (Fisher 2013: 120‑121).
47 The Noumea Accord was signed by France and representatives of the pro ‑France and pro ‑independence parties on 5 May 1998 and 
contained detailed governance arrangements leading up to a referendum on the territory’s ultimate future to be held by 31 December 2014. 
It was operationalised by France with the gazetting of the Organic Law in March 1999. The text of the Accord can be found at: (2002) 7(1) 
Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 88 (www.austlii.org accessed 20 October 2013)
48 Article 3. 1. 1
49 Article 3. 2. 2
50 Article 21 and 24 of the Organic Law 1999.
51 There was also significant movement between Vanuatu and New Caledonia when the former was administered jointly by France and Britain 
as the Condominium of the New Hebrides (Bedford, 1973). A legacy of this movement is several thousand Vanuatu ‑born people living in New 
Caledonia (estimated to be around 4,800 in 2013 according the United Nations Population Division (2013).
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Recognising the special nature of relations between New 
Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna, the Noumea Ac‑
cord makes specific provision for a separate agreement 
between the two territories52. In 2003, an agreement 
between New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna and France 
was entered into which provided for working rights for 
Wallisians in New Caledonia, and under which France 
undertook to cover the social security costs (Fisher, 2013: 
120). The current status of this agreement is not certain.
4.4 THE PACIFIC ISLAND FORUM 
AS AN UMBRELLA CLUSTER:
The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is one of a number of 
regional organisations that has developed out of the 
South Pacific Commission, established in the 1940s by 
the colonial administrations to provide technical advice 
and support (Graham, 2008). This provenance means 
that PIF can be considered a neo–colonial grouping, 
an accusation sometimes leveled at it by certain of its 
Pacific state members. PIF brings together annually the 
Heads of State of all the independent Pacific countries53, 
as well as Australia and New Zealand and senior repre‑
sentatives of countries with control over territories in 
the region such as the United Kingdom, France and the 
United States. In this sense, it is something of an um‑
brella cluster, spawning, in turn, sub ‑regional groupings 
such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (see below).
In the context of a structure for framing mobility in the 
Pacific, PIF (which we have not mapped separately in 
Figure 4) can be regarded as a weak, or minor, clus‑
ter which includes all Pacific independent and self‑
‑governing states as well as several states outside the is‑
lands as either formal members (like Australia and New 
Zealand) or as observers (such as the USA, China, Great 
Britain and France). While PIF member states have 
yet to formally agree on and introduce an agreement 
expressly privileging mutual admission of their citizens, 
it is likely that PIF membership underpins the existing 
extensive, but incomplete, visa free or visa ‑on ‑arrival 
arrangements that exist for short ‑term entry of Pacific 
country passport holders in the independent island 
states (see section on visas). Further, the privileging of 
PIF membership is reflected in the admission policies of 
other ‘hub’ states in relation to temporary seasonal wor‑
ker programmes such as New Zealand’s RSE scheme. In‑
deed, it was recommendations contained in a report by 
a PIF ‑sponsored Eminent Persons Group in 2004 (Chan 
et al., 2004) about the need for greater access to employ‑
ment opportunities in Australia and New Zealand that 
contributed to the decision by the latter two countries 
to introduce seasonal work pilots with selected Pacific 
Forum members in the latter part of the decade. It was 
at the Nadi meeting of the PIF in December 2006 that 
New Zealand’s Prime Minister announced that the RSE 
work policy would become operational by April 2007 
(Ramasamy et al., 2010; Bedford (C.E.), 2013).
PIF is also significant in the context of this review 
because the impact of climate change on the region has 
been a major item on the agenda of its annual meetings 
for several years now. The Republic of Marshall Islands, 
which hosted the 44th Forum meeting in September 
2013, made climate change the theme of the Forum. The 
2010 Port Vila Forum Communiqué54 noted that one of 
five key areas which had been identified by the Coun‑
cil of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) as 
priorities for leaders’ attention in the context of the Paci‑
fic Plan, was to “expand the definition of disaster risk 
management beyond that posed by climate change to be 
people focused, covering responses to health disasters as 
well as factoring in population growth and movement.” 
According to the Communiqué, leaders noted that these, 
and the other identified key areas, were included under 
the Pacific Plan priorities for 2010‑2013 and that “extra 
effort was required to achieve results in these areas.” 
Although the 2011 Auckland Communiqué55 refers to 
the displacement of people “as a result of the detrimen‑
tal impacts of climate change”, it seems to contemplate 
internal displacement only as it refers to displacement in 
the context of the need for adaptation finance “to enable 
Pacific island Forum countries to respond to the adapti‑
on needs of their people”. While the Communiqué56 also 
refers to the multiple benefits of regional arrangements 
relating the cross ‑border movement in the form of tem‑
porary labour mobility schemes, the potential linkages 
between these schemes and voluntary adaptive migra‑
tion in the context of climate change is not recognized. 
It is also worth noting that neither the 2012 Rarotonga 
Communiqué nor the 2013 Majuro Communiqué and 
Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership make any 
explicit mention of population movement in the context 
of natural disasters or climate change57.
52 Article 3. 2. 1
53 Fiji has been excluded from meetings of the PIF since 2009.
54 41st Pacific Islands Forum, Forum Communiqué Port Vila, Vanuatu 4‑5 August 2010, PIFS(10) 9, at p.5 paragraph [29].
55 42nd Pacific Islands Forum, Forum Communiqué Auckland, New Zealand, 7‑8 September 2011, PIFS(11) 8, at p.5 paragraph [16].
56 At Para [14].
57 There are some oblique references to mobility in the context of adaptation to climate ‑induced environmental change. The Cook Islands 
Communiqué, at paragraph [59], notes the Cook Island Prime Minister’s briefing on the Nansen Initiative and records the leaders agreement 
to ‘monitor’ population movement. The Majuro Declaration at paragraph [4] refers to the need to respond “urgently and sufficiently to the 
social, economic and security impacts of climate change so as to ensure the survival and viability of all Pacific small island developing 
States”.
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4.5 POST ‑COLONIAL AND 
‘EMERGING’ CLUSTERS
In recent years, a number of what might be termed ‘post‑
‑colonial clusters’ of Pacific states have emerged, partly 
spawned by developments within the Pacific Island 
Forum. The most ambitious of these, as far as moving 
towards some formal arrangements for privileged entry 
and work opportunities for member country citizens, is 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group. The origins and ope‑
rations of this sub ‑regional cluster are reviewed briefly 
in this section. Two other sub ‑regional clusters, which 
will not be discussed in detail here, are the Micronesi‑
an Chief Executives Summit (MCES) and the recently 
formed Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG). The MCES, 
which has been held annually since 2003 and which 
involves the Presidents of Palau, FSM and the RMI, 
reviews matters of common interest to the three inde‑
pendent states, including public health, climate change, 
energy, fisheries, and the Compacts of Free Association. 
The PLG, which involves the leaders of Samoa, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Cook Islands and Niue, was formed on the 
margins of the 2012 Rarotonga meeting of the Pacific 
Islands Forum. It is in its early establishment phase and 
in 2013 did not have any specific formal arrangements 
relating to movement between member states.
One of the two emerging clusters that are discussed 
briefly below is what we have termed an ‘Australian 
cluster’ which encompasses a restricted group of Pacific 
states plus East Timor that approved employers and 
recruiting agencies in Australia can access for labour to 
meet seasonal demands in particular industries. This is 
not an ‘established’ cluster linked with a particular era 
of colonial rule, although Australia did have one of the 
cluster members, Papua New Guinea, as a colony for 
much of the twentieth century. The second ‘emerging’ 
cluster shown in Figure 5, and which matches the Aus‑
tralian one in terms of countries involved, is the Pacific 
Labour Sending (PAILS) Forum. The members of PAILS 
Figure 5: Post‑colonial and Emerging Mobility Clusters
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meet biennially to discuss common issues relating to 
labour migration and in their meeting in Samoa in 
October 2013 they agreed to establish a formal entity to 
develop a more co ‑ordinated approach to labour migra‑
tion to countries on the Pacific Rim.
4.6 THE MELANESIAN SPEAR‑
HEAD GROUP (MSG) AS A POST‑
‑COLONIAL CLUSTER
The Melanesian Spearhead Group, which includes 
the four independent countries in the western Pacific 
(Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji) 
and a pro ‑independence political party in the French 
colony of New Caledonia (Le Front de Liberation Nati‑
onale Kanak et Socialiste or FLNKS) (Figure 5), had its 
origins in the early 1980s soon after the termination of 
the Anglo ‑French Condominium of the New Hebrides 
and the emergence of Vanuatu as an independent state 
in 1980. Between 1970 and 1980 Fiji, Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), Solomon Islands and Vanuatu had all become 
independent; the anomaly in Melanesia was the French 
colony of New Caledonia. The MSG was initially formed 
to keep pressure for decolonization of France’s Pacific 
territories alive in the Pacific Islands Forum. It was 
also concerned to build a stronger set of sub ‑regional 
relationships between the “big” countries of the Pacific, 
in part to offset a perceived greater unity of purpose and 
influence of many of the much smaller Polynesian states 
in the Forum.
In March 1988, the leaders of the four independent 
states and the FLNKS formalized the establishment of 
the MSG. They signed the “Agreed Principles of Co‑
‑operation amongst Independent States of Melanesia” 
with a view to promoting Melanesian identity and 
solidarity, especially through trade and economic deve‑
lopment. An initial trade agreement was signed between 
PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in 1993, with Fiji 
joining in 1998. In June 1996, at a meeting of the MSG 
leaders in PNG, the “Agreed Principles of Co ‑operation” 
were revisited with particular reference to the issue 
of decolonization of New Caledonia following almost 
a decade of unrest between pro‑ and anti ‑independence 
groups. Finally, in 1998, the FLNKS and the anti‑
‑independence groups joined the French government 
of the day in signing the “Noumea Accord” with all 
sides accepting that there would be a 15 year transition 
towards greater autonomy and a referendum on inde‑
pendence after 2014.
A series of military coup d’etat in Fiji between 1987 and 
2006, a decade of civil war on Bougainville in Papua 
New Guinea following the closure of one of the wor‑
ld’s largest copper mines in 1989, and ethnic tensions in 
the Solomon Islands that eventually led to the Regional 
Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in the 
early 2000s, along with the unrest in New Caledonia du‑
ring the late 1980s and 1990s, all posed major challenges 
for the MSG’s agenda of co ‑operation and collaboration 
around a shared vision for development in Melanesia. 
But the vision proved durable enough to sustain the con‑
tradictions to a “Pacific way” of resolving disputes and, 
in March 2007, 19 years after the leaders of the indepen‑
dent states formalized the establishment of the MSG in 
Port Vila, they met again in Port Vila and signed the 
“Agreement Establishing the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group” as a formally constituted sub ‑regional organisa‑
tion with a permanent secretariat, headed by a Director‑
‑General, located in Port Vila (MSG, 2007). Under 
this Agreement, a much more elaborate institutional 
framework was established to ensure regular, high ‑level 
consultation and the negotiation of agreements. Inclu‑
ded amongst these was provision for a two year rotating 
the role of chairperson of the MSG.
4. 6. 1 Mobility in the Melane‑
sian Spearhead Cluster
While a key focus of the MSG since the 1980s has been 
a trade agreement amongst member countries, freeing 
up the movement of skilled labour has also been on the 
agenda, especially during the two years Fiji’s Prime Mi‑
nister was in the chair between 2011 and 2013. In March 
2012, the Governments of Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding to facilitate the temporary movement 
of skilled nationals between their countries for the pur‑
poses of taking up employment without compromising 
national laws and policies on health, safety, minimum 
working conditions and border requirements. The MSG 
Skills Movement Scheme, which became operational in 
September 2012, is the first significant intra ‑regional la‑
bour mobility agreement in the western Pacific since the 
four countries transitioned to independence between 
1970 (Fiji) and 1980 (Vanuatu).
The MSG Skills Movement Scheme makes provision for 
up to 400 people from each of the member countries to 
work in another MSG country. The scheme is seen to be 
a model for temporary movement of skilled people in 
the Melanesian sub ‑region in that it would serve to assist 
to address a problem of under ‑employed/unemployed 
people with trade and professional skills in Fiji, while at 
the same time addressing skill shortages in other MSG 
countries. Fiji especially has a surplus of tertiary trained 
trades and service workers who could meet demands for 
their skills in PNG, the Solomons and Vanuatu (as long 
as they did not exceed the age limit for employment in 
government ‑funded services in these countries). Throu‑
gh this scheme, Melanesian leaders saw they could make 
better use of human resources within the region rather 
than sourcing skills from other parts of the world.
Several of the skill shortages in the different countries 
are similar – medical personnel, surveyors, engineers 
of various kinds, scientists, and a range of qualified 
practitioners in services such as business development, 
law and banking – and all countries have restrictions 
on access to relatively low ‑skilled jobs by non ‑nationals. 
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Notwithstanding these constraints, exchanges of small 
numbers of skilled workers between MSG countries 
are likely to get underway during 2014. The first group 
to move are likely to be some Fiji ‑trained teachers 
heading for Papua New Guinea which currently has 
a major shortage of teacherss in its state ‑sponsored 
education system58. The MSG Skills Movement Scheme 
will evolve slowly and its importance in the region is 
more symbolic than substantive at this stage in terms of 
actual labour mobility between countries in the sub‑
‑region. It is a symbol of growing sub ‑regional identity 
and commitment to seek solutions to human resource 
problems within the region rather than always relying 
on external sources to meet skill shortages.
4.7 EMERGING CLUSTERS?
4.7.1 Australia
Austalia’s relationship to and engagement with the 
Pacific has historically been very different from those of 
New Zealand (Bedford et al, 2007; Bedford and Hugo, 
2012). Since the 1950s New Zealand has, in general 
terms, given greater priority to Pacific Island count‑
ries in its migration policy. Indeed, a major source of 
Australia’s Pacific population is New Zealand ‑ Pacific 
Islanders who have become citizens of New Zealand, 
have been able to take advantage of the Trans ‑Tasman 
Travel Agreement that allows New Zealand citizens to 
stay in Australia indefinitely without applying for a visa 
(Bedford and Hugo, 2012).
Just as New Zealand assumed responsibility for a former 
German colony ‑ Western Samoa ‑ under a League of 
Nations Mandate, so too did Australia for the German 
colony in New Guinea. This was linked for administra‑
tive purposes to Papua, which Australia had taken over 
from Britain in the late 1890s, forming Papua New Gui‑
nea. Nevertheless, as Bedford and Hugo (2012: 54) note:
  [Australia’s] immigration policy has never priori‑
tised the Pacific, and only Papua New Guinea has 
been a consistent element of the country’s aid and 
foreign policy in the region. Indeed, Australian 
immigration officials have persistently denied any 
special relationships with Pacific countries—they 
are treated the same as other countries (except for 
New Zealand).
In contrast to this hands ‑off approach to facilitating 
Pacific mobility, some recent policy initiatives by the 
Australian government arguably herald the emergen‑
ce of an Australian mobility cluster in the region. The 
principal policy development has been the 2008 Pacific 
Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS) which became 
the Seasonal Work Program (SWP) in July 2012. Mo‑
delled on New Zealand’s RSE, but significantly different 
in organisation, the PSWPS initially offered seaso‑
nal work to citizens of Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, 
Kiribati and Tonga. In 2011, it was extended to include 
Nauru, Samoa, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu (Figure 
5). However, from the outset the Australian seasonal 
work scheme struggled to match the success of its New 
Zealand progenitor, with fewer than 150 of the 2500 
permits allocated to the PSWPS being filled by seasonal 
workers during the first two years of operation (Bedford 
and Hugo, 2012: 71). Following the introduction of the 
Seasonal Work Program in July 2013, an on ‑going re‑
placement for the PSWPS, the scheme has been gaining 
momentum and in the year ended June 2013 just under 
1,500 workers, mainly from Tonga, were recruited.
Also worth noting in this context is the Australia‑
‑Pacific Technical College (APTC), an Australian 
Government initiative announced at the Pacific Islands 
Forum in 2006, which aims to provide Australian‑
‑standard skills and qualifications through programmes 
offered in the Pacific that have relevance for a wide 
range of vocational careers where skilled employees 
are in high demand. Courses and qualifications cover 
occupations such as aged and community care, hairdre‑
ssing, hospitality ‑related occupations, as well as trade 
and technical courses such as carpentry, electrical work, 
tiling, plumbing, and refrigeration and air conditioning. 
Significantly, many of these courses appear on Austra‑
lia’s Skilled Occupations List59 meaning that graduates 
may be able to transition to work from a Temporary 
Graduate Visa (Subclass 485) without leaving Australia. 
There are two streams, one resulting in the grant of an 
18 month visa, the other for up the four years depending 
on the qualification60. This is potentially a significant 
policy development in that, while Australia does have 
a specific temporary work visa (Subclass 457), the 
evidence suggests only a very small percentage of the 
457 visas granted have been issued to workers from the 
Pacific61.
58 John Licht (2013) MSG Skills Movement Scheme (SMS), presentation to the Pacific Labour Sending (PAILS) Forum, Apia, 23 October 2013.
59 Version July 2013, www.immi.gov.au/skilled/sol, (accessed 9 October 2013).
60 www.immi.gov.au/students/385/ (accessed 9 October 2013).
61 Bedford and Hugo (2012: 66) note that, in the year to the end of June 2008, despite a nearly 30% increase in the total number of 457 visas 
granted, only 1.6% were to Pacific workers and them mostly from Papua New Guinea and Fiji. Other schemes include the Kiribati Australia 
Nurses Initiative (KANI) which allows for training of nurses to Australian standards, thus giving the recipients of the training the right to apply 
for 457 visas and possibly to transition to residence in Australia from such visas (see here, McAdam, 2012: 206).
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4.7.2 Pacific Labour Sending (PAILS) Forum
The World Bank has been playing a major role in the 
Pacific since the mid‑2000s in developing potentials 
and capacities for Pacific states to increase their op‑
portunities for gaining access to labour markets within 
the region as well as in countries on the Pacific Rim. 
Their major report, Expanding Opportunities for Pa‑
cific Islanders Through Labour Mobility at Home and 
Away (World Bank, 2006) had a significant impact on 
the discussions in Australia and New Zealand about 
managed seasonal labour migration that led to the 
establishment of the RSE and SWP schemes (Bedford 
(C.E.), 2013). More recently they have initiated and faci‑
litated dialogue between senior policy makers in Pacific 
labour sending countries and representatives of major 
international agencies with an interest in migration 
(ILO, IOM), regional organisations (Office of the Chief 
Trade Adviser (OCTA) and the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG), as well as Australia and New Zealand. In 
turn, this dialogue has generated meetings of the Pacific 
Labour Sending (PAILS) Forum in 2011 and 2013.
At the PAILS Forum held in Apia (Samoa) between 22 
and 24 October 2013 senior officials considered pro‑
posals for greater regional co ‑operation around the 
management of labour migration to maximise develop‑
ment gains in the region. This initiative runs in parallel 
with the negotiations taking place around a free trade 
agreement between Pacific states and Australia and 
New Zealand (PACER ‑Plus) which includes a chapter on 
labour mobility (Bedford and Hugo, 2012). In essence, 
the PAILS Forum represents an emerging cluster of 
countries with some common recent labour mobility 
experiences (all Pacific countries represented participate 
in the RSE and SWP schemes) which could provide the 
foundation for some strategies for greater collaboration 
in order for Pacific countries to be more competitive in 
international markets for labour, especially markets in 
Asia (Figure 5). This is not a firmly defined cluster yet, 
but is further evidence of attempts being made from 
within the region (e.g. Melanesian Spearhead Group) as 
well as with the support of international agencies (the 
PAILS Forum) and countries on the Pacific rim (RSE 
and SWP) to create greater opportunities for labour mo‑
bility in the region. All of these initiatives, including the 
on ‑going PACER ‑Plus negotiations, are contributing to 
some streamlining of processes and the breaking down 
of barriers to population movement between countries. 
In this context they have relevance for the long ‑term ad‑
justment of Pacific peoples to slow ‑onset environmental 
changes linked to or exacerbated by global warming.
4.8 CLUSTERS AND HUBS AS 
MOBILITY ARCHITECTURE: 
SOME OBSERVATIONS
The clustering of countries and territories into sub‑
‑regional groupings provides a useful architecture for 
framing contemporary Pacific migration and unde‑
rstanding its future potential. There are a number of 
features of this clustering which need emphasis in the 
context of cross ‑border population movement linked 
with natural disasters and the effects of climate change.
First, the clustering of states into sub ‑regional grou‑
pings is neither fixed nor static. Over time, new clusters 
have emerged as counterpoints to or developments of 
existing clusters. This dynamism, which is a critically 
important feature of the contemporary architecture, has 
the potential to greatly enhance mobility in the region 
by fostering new bilateral and multilateral agreements 
providing for the temporary or permanent cross ‑border 
movement of Pacific peoples as an aspect of the ongoing 
and continual alignment of state interests at a sub–regi‑
onal level. The development of the Melanesian Spe‑
arhead cluster is a case ‑in ‑point. Originally conceived 
as a mechanism within PIF to promote decolonization 
of France’s Pacific territories, its initial emphasis was on 
promoting Melanesian identity and solidarity, especia‑
lly through trade and economic development. It is only 
since early 2012 that an explicit labour mobility dimen‑
sion has been added to the cluster with the MSG Skills 
Movement Scheme.
As noted earlier, other sub ‑regional groups exist, such 
as the Polynesian Leaders Group and the Micronesian 
Chief Executive’s Summit. There is no reason to think 
that these grouping cannot develop over time into 
mobility ‑related clusters. Should sufficient convergence 
of state interest occur on the issue of disaster ‑induced 
cross ‑border migration, including through the effects of 
climate change, this dynamic clustering process will be 
crucial in enhancing mobility as a means of adaptation 
by opening up new pathways for movement. Also in this 
context, it is important not to overlook the convergence 
of state interest as expressed through bilateral mobility‑
‑related agreements (Boncour and Burson, 2010). 
Historically, the bilateral agreements both New Zealand 
and the United States have with selected Pacific count‑
ries have been an important mechanism for enhancing 
Pacific migration.
Second, the clusters are not structured in the same way. 
In the colonial clusters, where New Zealand and United 
States act as central hubs, multi ‑tiered structures exist. 
This means that the effect of cluster membership is not 
homogenous across the cluster. The extent to which 
cluster membership confers privileged rights of entry 
and stay to the citizens of cluster states is highly varia‑
ble within the cluster. The degree to which mobility is 
enhanced depends on which tier in which structure the 
Pacific island citizen exists.
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At a regional level, further variability derives from dif‑
ferent bundles of privileged rights of admission and stay 
being conferred between these two clusters. While there 
is some overlap, there are important differences also. 
The range of rights include the granting of unfettered 
right of entry and stay by way of an entitlement to hub‑
‑state citizenship (New Zealand and the United States); 
the preferential entitlement to residence by targeted 
quotas (New Zealand); privileged access to the hub‑
‑state labour market (the United States) and temporary 
work in certain sectors of the hub ‑state economy (New 
Zealand).
In contrast, the Melanesian Spearhead Group cluster 
has a flatter structure in which, while state influence 
may vary, no state acts as a central hub. This means that 
the effect of cluster membership is more homogenous, 
relating to privileged rights of entry for MSG country 
visitors to Papua New Guinea and temporary access to 
selected occupations within the four labour markets 
of the independent states. As specified in Annex 1 to 
the Skills Movement Scheme, those occupations which 
are subjected to the scheme are professional, manage‑
rial or skilled ‑trades related. Many have minimum 
levels of experience requirements. Outside this limited 
privileging of some skilled migrants, semi or unskilled 
migrants from in ‑cluster states, or those in ‑cluster 
skilled migrants whose occupations are not included in 
Annex 1, will be caught by the law generally regulating 
the employment of non ‑resident labour.
Table 4 captures some of the variability in privile‑
ging generated by the cluster and hub architecture in 
the Pacific region. It reveals that relatively few states 
and territories, representing a small percentage of the 
overall regional population, have hub ‑state citizenship 
conferring unfettered rights of entry, stay and labour 
market access. A slightly larger number have access to 
special residence categories or unfettered access to hub‑
‑state labour markets. Most of the regional population 
has, at best, the ability to qualify for temporary work 
schemes. Another interesting feature shown in Table 4 
is that, despite the US and French clusters including far 
smaller shares of the total regional population than the 
New Zealand cluster, both allow a larger share of that 
population greater freedom of movement as the holders 
of hub ‑state citizenship.
The important point to note here is that this variability, 
both between and within clusters, provides a multi‑
plicity of policy nodes around which a convergence of 
regional state interest in addressing the potential for 
cross ‑border movement of peoples in the context of 
natural disasters and climate change can translate into 
future action.
The clusters are not sealed from each other and many 
overlap (Table 4). A striking example in this regard is 
Vanuatu, which is a member of both the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group and the New Zealand cluster and 
has some historical legacies relevant for future popu‑
lation movement in the French cluster to which it once 
belonged as a colony. Vanuatu is also included in the 
emerging Australian cluster through its participation 
on the SWP. Citizens of Vanuatu therefore enjoy a high 
degree of relative mobility potential even if the num‑
bers of Ni ‑Vanuatu living overseas in 2013 is small. The 
relative mobility of Ni ‑Vanuatu may well be due for 
further imminent boost if current negotiations between 
Vanuatu, the EU, France, New Caledonia and Australia 
regarding reciprocal arrangements for visa ‑on ‑arrival 
status come to fruition (Ligo, 2013).
While the formation and development of new clusters 
creates clear mobility enhancing pathways, particularly 
for short ‑term labour migration, the effect of clusters 
and hubs on promoting regional mobility generally is far 
less certain. Important gains have been made, notably 
with New Zealand’s RSE scheme, which is widely re‑
garded to be a successful policy development involving 
reasonably substantial numbers of Pacific workers, but 
both the Australian SWP and the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group Skills Movement Scheme have provided limited 
mobility gains to date. The former has not yet proven 
to be a sufficiently attractive vehicle for the recruitment 
of significant numbers of Pacific workers. The latter is 
capped at 400 per host country and only offers opportu‑
nity to a narrow segment of the sub ‑region’s population.
There have also been policy interventions that have had 
a negative impact upon regional mobility. Of particu‑
lar note here is the closing by New Zealand in 2012 of 
the adult child and sibling categories and the further 
tightening of eligibility criteria in the parent category in 
the family sponsored migrant stream (Bedford and Liu, 
2013)62. Both policy mechanisms have been important 
pathways for migration of Pacific Islanders into to New 
Zealand and have contributed greatly to the growth of 
the Pacific diaspora. The changes by Australia to its 
Social Security and Citizenship legislation in 2001 have 
also had some negative implications for Pacific Islanders 
who became New Zealand citizens and then travelled to 
Australia under the Trans ‑Tasman Travel Agreement. In 
the past three years there has been increasing pressure 
from New Zealand’s Prime Minister on his Australian 
counterpart to remove the restrictions the current policy 
imposes on New Zealand citizens who have moved to 
Australia since 2001 (Ansley, 2013).
62 Since the late 1990s New Zealand’s policy governing the issuing of residence visas has favoured entry of skilled migrants. The skilled 
migrant stream has consistently accounted for around 60 percent of 40,000‑50,000 residence visas issued in a given year, while the 
family sponsorship stream (including parents, adult children, siblings, and other relatives who are not part of the nuclear family that can 
accompany the skilled migrant) has accounted for around 30 percent of the annual intake. The international or humanitarian stream 
(including the special quotas for Pacific migrants and the annual quota of Convention refugees) accounts for the remaining 10 percent of 
visas issued. Further information on these streams can be found at the Immigration New Zealand website, www.immigration.govt.nz.
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Sub -region/country Established Emergent
 NZ US French PIF MSG Aust PAILS
Melanesia   
Fiji X* X* X
New Caledonia  X (X)
Papua New Guinea X X X X X
Solomon Islands X X X X X
Vanuatu X X X X X
Micronesia   
Federated States (FSM)  X X  
Guam  X  
Kiribati X X  X X
Marshall Islands  X X  
Nauru  X  
Nthern Mariana Islands  X  
Palau  X X  
Polynesia   
American Samoa  X  
Cook Islands X X  
French Polynesia  X  
Niue X X  
Samoa X X  X X
Tokelau X  
Tonga X X  X X
Tuvalu X X  X X
Wallis and Futuna  X  
% Pacific pop. In cluster 91.0 6.1 4.8 94.6 89.5 83.2 83.2
% Pacific pop in cluster
with hub -state citizenship




Table 4: Population Mobility Clusters in the Pacific, 2013
X* Fiji is currently suspended from NZ’s Pacific Access Category and RSE scheme. Fiji’s membership of the Pacific Islands Forum has also been 
suspended
(X) New Caledonia’s pro ‑independence party the FLNKS, is a full member and current Chair of the Melanesian Spearhead Group
X Denotes state/territory whose citizens also have hub ‑state citizenship
Note: Percentages of Pacific population in clusters derived from population estimates
in Table 1. Data from SPC Population Data Sheet, 2013, http://www.spc.int/sdd/
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63 At section 212(l) of the US Immigration and Nationality Act.
64 The Guam ‑CNMI Visa Waiver Program Interim Final Rule (IFR), (16 January 2009).
65 IFR, part IIIA(3)
Changes in the US Cluster have also decreased mobi‑
lity in some areas. The Federal Consolidated Natural 
Resources Act 2008 replaced the Guam Visa Waiver 
Program with a new Guam ‑CNMI Visa Waiver Pro‑
gram63. A subsequent “Interim Final Ruling “(IFR)64 by 
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection in 2009, which 
sets out the requirements for non ‑immigrant visitors 
seeking admission into Guam or the CNMI under the 
new programme, designated only Australia, Nauru, 
New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea for participati‑
on in the Guam ‑CNMI Visa Waiver Programme. The 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa, which 
were included in the previous Guam Visa Waiver Pro‑
gramme, were not included in the new programme. The 
IFR states that the Solomon Islands were not included 
‘in consideration of on ‑going civil and political insta‑
bility”. Vanuatu, and Western Samoa are not included 
on the list of eligible countries due to very high rates 
of refusal for non ‑immigrant visitor visas. In addition, 
these countries did not provide a “significant economic 
benefit” to the CNMI65.
Other changes in the US cluster relating to amendments 
to the CFA agreements between The United States and 
Palau, The Federated States of Micronesia, and the Re‑
public of the Marshall Islands do not appear to have sig‑
nificantly reduced migration flows. From 2003 through 
2008, the share of Guam’s and Hawaii’s total populati‑
ons that are Compact migrants grew. In 2008, Compact 
migrants represented approximately 12 percent of the 
total population in Guam and one percent of the total 
population of Hawaii (US GAO, 2011: 15‑16).
4. 8. 1 Cluster membership and nat‑
ural disasters: two examples
The following examples illustrate the importance of 
cluster membership in the context of natural disasters 
with reference to the New Zealand cluster. New Zea‑
land typically strives to be a good international citizen 
by offering assistance in the wake of natural disasters, 
especially those that affect its Pacific neighbours. The 
fact of cluster membership and tier status within the 
cluster has an impact on the scale and type of assistance 
and, in particular, the extent to which that assistance 
has implications for cross ‑border movement in the wake 
of natural disasters.
Tier 1
The ‘tier one’ status of Niue was clearly evident after 
Cyclone Heta struck the island in 2004 and the New 
Zealand government offered to resettle the resident 
population of around 1,800 in New Zealand. This offer 
was not taken up and, while there was some cross‑
‑border displacement to New Zealand and Australia, 
many Niueans who were resident in New Zealand 
returned to assist with the reconstruction efforts and 
to reside. In fact, the pre and post ‑disaster populations 
remained relatively stable (Bedford et al, 2006). Similar‑
ly, following a hurricane in 1966, approximately half of 
the population of the Tokelau Islands (also ‘tier 1’) was 
relocated in New Zealand. Longitudinal studies carried 
out on the Tokelauan community in NZ have showed 
that the relocated population and their children had 
a range of poor health outcomes relative to their kin at 
home (Salmon et al 1985; Lane et al 2005). This shows 
that relocation of communities into new environments, 
even when leading to some form of durable solution, can 
inherently give rise to ongoing protection needs.
Tier 2
By way of contrast, the assistance offered to Samoa 
after a devastating tsunami struck the southern coast of 
Upolu in September 2009 and the support provided to 
Tuvalu during a severe drought in 2011, reflect their tier 
2 status. Following the tsunami villagers from the badly 
damaged Falealili District were given the opportunity 
to work on orchards in New Zealand under the RSE 
scheme even though the regional quotas for seasonal 
labour were full. This dispensation, which was just one 
of the types of assistance provided to Samoa by New 
Zealand after this disaster, was approved under the RSE 
Strengthening Pacific Partnership (SPP) programme 
which was being piloted in 2009 (Bedford (C.E.), 2013). 
Samoa’s special relationship with New Zealand, en‑
shrined in the 1962 Treaty of Friendship, ensures a rapid 
response from New Zealand following a natural disaster.
The severe drought that affected Tuvalu during 2011 
caused major problems for fresh water supply for the 
urban population on Funafuti. New Zealand, along with 
other countries in the region, provided assistance with 
shipments of bottled water and the installation of small 
desalination units. Tuvaluans were also assisted to find 
seasonal work in New Zealand under the SPP programme 
at the time of the drought, but this assistance pre ‑dated the 
drought. The specific New Zealand response to drought in 
Tuvalu was targeted at assistance to people in the islands, 
not new forms of assistance to leave the country.
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5. CROSS‑BORDER POPULATION 
MOVEMENT: THE CURRENT VISA 
SITUATION
The underlying regional migration architecture outlined in the previous section provides a major dimen-
sion of the context within which flows of people between island countries and some of the major destina-
tions for migrants on the Pacific Rim. The major mechanism for regulating these flows into each country 
is the issuing of visas for short -term entry and stay or long -term residence. In this section we examine the 
extent to which this architecture, as currently expressed though immigration law and regulation, allows 
or impedes the undertaking of voluntary adaptive migration or relocation as a means of reducing the risk 
of future forced displacement. In considering this we have concentrated on three main issues:
1
   To what extent do Pacific states grant visa free or visa ‑on ‑arrival entry rights to citizens of other Pacific coun‑
tries? Just how easy is it for people to move around the Pacific?
2
   How easy is it for Pacific visitors to other Pacific countries to obtain, or transition to, short ‑term work visas/
permits without having to leave the country they are visiting? The issue here is how does the current regional 
migration architecture facilitate the generation of remittance flows, which can potentially be used to assist 
funding in ‑situ adaption or otherwise promoting community resilience?
3
   What pathways to residence exist? If long ‑term or permanent stay becomes necessary or unavoidable, what 
scope for relocation exists under current residence policy settings in the region?
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5.1 BASIC MOBILITY: VISA 
FREE OR VISA ‑ON ‑ARRIVAL 
TRAVEL IN THE PACIFIC
A review of Immigration law in the region reveals that 
there is a large degree of privileging of Pacific citizens 
in terms of granting visa free of visa ‑on ‑arrival entry 
as visitors or for tourism purposes. Entry is granted for 
periods ranging from a maximum of 30 days66, to a ma‑
ximum of 3 months67. Extensions are possible.
In contrast, the countries of the Pacific Rim do not 
generally grant waiver or visa ‑on ‑arrival status to citi‑
zens of Pacific islands. For example, unless granted visa 
waiver status, all persons require a visa to be permitted 
to travel to New Zealand. However, under New Zea‑
land immigration law, visa waiver status is conferred 
on citizens of over 50 countries including Australian 
citizens and permanent residents, citizens of France, 
the UK, and citizens and nationals the United States68. 
Similar provisions exist in relation to Australia69 and the 
United States70. To the extent that PIF membership gives 
rise to privileged rights of entry, it does so on mainly 
for citizens of Pacific states travelling within the island 
countries only. This may have important consequences 
for individuals or households wishing to respond to 
natural disasters by moving across regional borders. At 
a base level, and putting all other considerations side, 
current immigration laws in the Pacific mean this is far 
more likely to be actualized by travelling to another is‑
land country than to the Pacific Rim countries, althou‑
gh getting to another island country may require a visa 
to transit to the destination if the travel is by air.
While there is a general freedom for Pacific state citizens 
to travel between island countries, there are anomalies. 
Thus, for example, citizens of Kiribati and Tuvalu are 
excluded from the permit–on ‑arrival status under Solo‑
mon Islands immigration law71. Citizens of Papua New 
Guinea are excluded from permit ‑on ‑arrival status in 
Niue72. Nauru is exceptional in that, according to infor‑
mation on the government website, entry permits must 
be applied for in advance by all non ‑citizens73.
Cluster status also impacts on entitlements to visa 
free or visa ‑on ‑arrival privileging. Under the Vanua‑
tu Immigration Act 2010, “a national or citizen of 
a member state of the Melanesian Spearhead Group” 
is an exempt person74. A similar special status exists 
for citizens of Melanesian Spearhead countries visiting 
Papua New Guinea – they are exempt from the requi‑
rement to purchase a visa on arrival and instead get 
a special MSG stamp in their passport (Michael Gene, 
24 October 2013, pers comm.). In a number of instances, 
it is status as a citizen of the ‘colonial’ hub ‑state that 
confers this right, not nationality of the Pacific coun‑
try itself. Nationals of the Cook islands, for example, 
are eligible for visa ‑free entry into Fiji if they travel on 
a New Zealand passport or into Tonga or Vanuatu as 
New Zealand citizens75. Similarly, citizens of Guam and 
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
are typically accorded visa waiver privileges as US citi‑
zens. The position as regards American Samoa is more 
nuanced. As inhabitants of an ‘outlying possession’, 
American Samoans are ‘non ‑citizen nationals’ under US 
law. There is no common treatment of this unique status 
across the region. Some countries’ immigration laws 
confer visa ‑free privileges on US citizens only76, others 
on ‘nationals’ as well as citizens77. A final point worth 
66 See, for example, the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Niue, Palau, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands.
67 A visitor permit in the Solomon Islands entitles a visitor to remain in Solomon Islands for any period or periods in the aggregate, not 
exceeding three months in any period of twelve months.
68 See Section 14 Immigration act 2009, Immigration (Visa, Entry Permission, and Related Matters) Regulations 2010 Schedule 2, and INZ 
Immigration Instructions at E.2.1
69 In 1996, Australia introduced the Electronic Travel Authority (ETA) system, an electronically stored authority for travel to Australia for 
short ‑term visits for tourism or business purposes. It replaces the visa label or stamp in a passport and removes the need for application 
forms. However, it is only available to passport holders from a number of countries, regions and locations. While passport holders from the 
United States, France and the United Kingdom are able to apply for ETAs, no person travelling on any passport issued by a Pacific Island 
country can apply for an ETA. New Zealanders have special provisions entitling them privileged access to Australia; see Fact Sheet 55 
www.immi.gov.au (accessed, 11 October 2013).
70 See Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1187; www.travel.state.gov (accessed, 10 October 2013).
71 Solomon Islands, Ministry of Commerce, Industries Labour and Immigration; www.commerce.gov.sb (accessed, 1 October 2013).
72 Schedule 2, Immigration Regulations 2011.
73 See; www.naurugov.nr/about ‑nauru/visiting ‑nauru/visa ‑requirements (accessed, 1 October 2013). This requirement for visas to visit Nauru 
dates back to the period when phosphate was being mined on the island and there was extensive labour migration from Kiribati and Tuvalu.
74 See; Immigration Act 2010, Section 2(d).
75 Department of Immigration www.immigration.gov.fj/(accessed 13 October 2013); Tonga Consulate General San Francisco; www.
tongaconsul.com (accessed, 30 September 2013); section 2, Vanuatu Immigration Act 2010.
76 Examples include: France (including the French Territories), Niue, the Republic of the Marshall islands
77 Examples include: New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, and Fiji.
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emphasising in this context is the intra ‑cluster privi‑
leging within the US cluster. As noted earlier, the CFA 
states of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and 
the Federated State of Micronesia, have mutual privile‑
ging arrangements.
There are certain unavoidable hurdles which must 
be overcome by all, such as obtaining a passport and 
finding sufficient funds to travel. Health and character 
requirements are uniform features of all immigration 
laws and may impact upon the mobility of a percentage 
of the regional population. In general terms, however, 
there is a high level of basic intra ‑regional mobility 
facilitated by national immigration laws. At the more 
forced end of the migration spectrum following a natu‑
ral disaster, for example, there may well be an issue as 
to whether persons can effect cross ‑border migration as 
bona fide visitors for tourism purposes, and the du‑
ration of any period of lawful stay may be insufficient 
for the affected person’s needs. However, as one shifts 
towards the voluntary end of the spectrum, visa waiver 
or visa ‑on ‑arrival privileges allow Pacific populations 
the chance to travel internationally, to visit kin and to 
potentially seek out business and employment opportu‑
nities in other parts of the region as well as in selected 
countries outside the region (France, New Zealand, 
United States of America) for members of particular 
clusters. In this way, the high degree of temporary mobi‑
lity as a visitor under immigration law prevailing in the 
region provides an important mechanism for facilitating 
voluntary adaptive migration by providing opportuni‑
ties to explore the potential to migrate for longer periods 
or on a permanent basis.
5.2 WORK PERMITS
An ability to enter and stay, while plainly important for 
securing safety from harm both in anticipation of an 
imminent natural disaster and in its immediate after‑
math, will only provide a partial immigration solution. 
Disaster ‑affected persons who do move across interna‑
tional borders will need to be, and in many cases are, 
provided with assistance by the host ‑state and in many 
cases by the international community. Also in those 
host states with established diaspora communities these 
can and do provide support. However, where diaspora 
communities are established in the host ‑state, the cultu‑
ral imperative to assist, embedded deep in the Pasifika 
psyche, can place financial pressure on host households 
and contribute to poverty in those communities (Mc‑
Leod, 2010).
In both the contexts of voluntary adaptive migration 
by individuals and planned relocation of larger groups, 
including entire communities, the ability of persons to 
find work will be an integral component of any durab‑
le solution. An essential issue to consider, therefore, 
is the extent to which current immigration laws in 
Pacific countries allow for the employment of migrants 
generally, as a means by which disaster ‑affected indivi‑
duals and households who do move across international 
borders can seek to provide sustainable livelihoods for 
themselves.
Here it is important to emphasise that, for those indivi‑
duals with professional or trade ‑related skills such as in 
teaching, construction, nursing or public administrati‑
on, existing bilateral and regional agreements already 
create such opportunity to move abroad. At a broader le‑
vel, however, there are number of features of the present 
regional legal framework regulating the employment of 
non ‑resident labour which are potentially limiting.
Unsurprisingly, legal frameworks in Pacific countries 
generally privilege the right of host ‑state citizens and 
residents to employment. Some legal frameworks are 
explicit in this regard. An example is the Legal Code of 
the Federated States of Micronesia, which states78:
The Congress of Micronesia (sic) finds and declares that 
it is essential to a balanced and stable economy in the 
Trust Territory that Trust Territory citizen workers be 
given preference in employment in occupations and in‑
dustries in the Trust Territory, and that the public inte‑
rest requires that the employment of noncitizen workers 
in such occupations and industries not impair the wages 
and working condition of Trust Territory workers.
The regional multilateral and bilateral arrangements 
which allow for the cross ‑border movement of certain 
classes of people or for sector ‑specific host ‑state employ‑
ment are not so much exceptions to this general privi‑
leging as being reflections in policy that no resident or 
citizen worker is qualified, willing and able to perform 
the role in question.
An important point to note is that, in many instances, 
obtaining a work visa is an employer ‑led process. An 
often overlooked point in discussions on migration 
is the extent to which employers act as admissions 
gate ‑keepers (MBIE, 2013). In many instances, it is 
the employer who must obtain prior authority to 
recruit non ‑resident workers and provide the relevant 
employment ‑regulating Ministry with sufficient proof 
that no resident of citizen worker is able to fill the posi‑
tion in question79. The law in many countries contains 
78 Title 51, Section 113.
79 See, for example: Papua New Guinea Employment of Non ‑Citizens Act 2007, section 18; The Republic of the Marshall Islands Labour (Non‑
‑Resident Workers) Act 2006, sections 16 (Occupational Shortage List permit), 17 (general work permit) and 18 (temporary); Federated 
States of Micronesia Legal Code, Title 51, section 131; The Cook Islands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, www.mfai.gov.ck 
(accessed 13 October 2013); Vanuatu Labour (Work Permits) Act 1985, section 2(2).
44 TECHNICAL PAPER
highly prescriptive requirements regarding advertising 
by the employer which may impact upon the ability of 
these systems to respond in a timely fashion ‑ particu‑
larly in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster80.
The employer ‑led nature of the work permit regime 
in many counties is a potentially limiting feature of 
migration law in the region in the context of voluntary 
adaptive migration or planned relocation. It places a pre‑
mium on affected populations having some pre ‑existing 
relationship or otherwise forging one with a host ‑state 
employer who has identified and is able to demonstrate 
a need for the employment of non ‑resident labour. In this 
regard, a significant factor will be the existence of a large 
established diaspora that is sufficiently embedded in the 
host ‑state economy to provide employment to their kin.
Access to employment in Pacific countries is often high‑
ly regulated and controlled. Visas are typically granted 
for work with a specific employer. Many countries in the 
region have binding legal repatriation provisions81. Some 
temporary work provisions, such as those in Fiji and the 
Cook Islands, may require a citizen to be trained along‑
side the non ‑resident worker as a condition on award of 
a work visa82. In a number of instances, access to work 
for non ‑citizens is limited to specified occupations or 
sectors of the economy. This takes a number of forms. In 
some countries migrant workers can only be employed 
in specifically designated occupations. In American 
Samoa, for example, employment of non ‑citizens is 
confined to two canneries and a call ‑centre83.
Other countries have a list of reserved occupations. 
Most notable in this context is Papua New Guinea 
where the Employment of Non ‑Citizens Act 2007 
allows for regulations to be issued prescribing specified 
occupations as being reserved only for citizens84. If so 
prescribed, no work permit can be issued in respect of 
these occupations. The resulting Employment of Non‑
‑Citizen Regulations 2008 contains a list of occupations 
reserved for citizens85. It includes many occupations 
which large numbers of the Pacific workforce would be 
able to undertake such as gardeners, nanny/babysitter, 
child care worker, cafe workers, waiters, logging plant 
operators, taxi and bus drivers. While the MSG Skills 
Movement Scheme is therefore a positive development, 
many persons living subsistence lifestyles or without 
the relevant skills qualifications and experience, but 
nevertheless vulnerable to the adverse effects of natural 
disasters, will be unable to leverage this scheme as a me‑
ans of effecting voluntary adaptive migration.
In other countries, such as Vanuatu and the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, only a fixed quota or percen‑
tage of non ‑resident workers may be employed by an 
employer, with the remainder of workforce positions 
being reserved for residents or citizens86. This feature 
of employment law in many parts of the region, desig‑
ned to provide maximum employment opportunities 
to rapidly growing citizen populations, will need to be 
factored into discussions around relocation along with 
more familiar issues such as land tenure and access to 
land by non ‑citizens.
A further issue of importance in the context of disaster‑
‑induced cross ‑border movement is the ease with which 
persons entering on temporary visitor visas can tran‑
sition to work permits while remaining in the country. 
It may simply not be feasible or safe to return to the 
country of origin in order to be issued with a permit 
offshore. What information is available presents a mixed 
picture. In the Republic of the Marshall Islands, for 
example, unless the applicant falls within the investor 
or family categories, there is a general prohibition on 
any work permit being issued in ‑country. While there 
is an absolute discretion to grant in ‑country permits, 
this can only be done “under exceptional circumstan‑
ces.”87 Similarly restrictive provisions operate in Papua 
New Guinea and the Federated States of Micronesia88. 
In Niue, while a person on a temporary permit is able 
to apply for a further temporary permit in ‑country, 
the position is unclear as the legislation only expressly 
provides for temporary work and student permits, not 
visitor permits89. In contrast, in Vanuatu, the legislation 
allows for a person in Vanuatu as the holder of a valid 
visa to apply for a further visa whether of the same or 
of a different kind90. In the Solomon Islands, legislation 
expressly allows regulations to be issued setting out the 
80 Papua New Guinea Employment of Non ‑Citizens Act 2007, section 13.
81 Papua New Guinea Employment of Non ‑Citizens Act 2007, section 40; American Samoa Title 51, Chapter 9, Section 41.0910(a).
82 Cook Islands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, www.mfai.gov.ck (accessed 13 October 2013); Fiji Department of Immigration, 
www.immigration.gov.fj (accessed 13 October 2013).
83 Title 51, Chapter 9, section 41.909 Code of American Samoa.
84 Section 12.
85 Regulation 10 and Schedule 2.
86 Vanuatu, Labour (Work Permits) Act 1985, section 9; Republic of Marshall Islands Labour (Non ‑resident Workers) Act 2006, section 29.
87 Republic of the Marshall Islands Labour (Non ‑Resident Workers) Act 2006, section 23.
88 Papua New Guinea Employment of Non ‑Citizens Act 2007, section 19. A change of status is allowed if the person is a dependent spouse 
seeking work, or is married to a PNG citizen; Federated States of Micronesia code, Title 50, section 104(3).
89 Niue Immigration Act 2011, sections 12, 14, and 16.
90 Vanuatu Immigration Act 2010, Section 34(2).
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circumstances in which a visa holder can transition to 
another type of visa91. In the cases of the Cook Islands 
and Fiji, the information contained on the websites of 
the relevant ministries does not indicate whether in‑
‑country transition to residence is permissible.
In New Zealand and Australia transitioning from 
a visitor’s visa to a temporary work visa (excluding the 
special ‑purpose seasonal work visas in both countries) 
while in ‑country is permitted, as is seeking permanent 
residence via a transition from temporary work or 
tertiary study (Bedford and Hugo, 2012). In the case of 
citizens of Pacific countries, transitioning to residence 
from both study and temporary work visas has often 
been achieved via the family sponsorship route rather 
than the skilled migrant category (Bedford, 2008).
5.3 RESIDENCE
Immigration frameworks in the region contain a range 
of pathways to residence. A common one, although 
often expressed in different ways and with varying 
criteria92, is the provision of a pathway to residence for 
spouses and dependent children of host ‑state citizens. 
This privileging of residence for spouses and immediate 
dependent children is likely to simply reflect histori‑
cal immigration policy settings, but could also reflect 
concerns over land ownership in the host ‑state. In some 
settings, particularly in host ‑states with established dia‑
spora, spousal residence will be a useful policy mecha‑
nism for facilitating voluntary adaptive migration over 
time. Nevertheless, sponsorship criteria, including mi‑
nimum income levels, may operate to limit the potential 
for this to be leveraged93. Further, some countries have 
a criterion relating to a specified minimum duration of 
the marriage94 which could also serve to be a limiting 
factor. There are pathways to residence that can poten‑
tially be leveraged in the context of voluntary adaptive 
migration or planned relocation, but the options relating 
to spouses and dependent children, or the settlement of 
persons who have been living lawfully for many years in 
the host ‑country, are fairly limited.
In regulatory systems that allow for residence based on 
specified periods of legal presence in the host ‑state the 
planned relocation of vulnerable people of communities 
over time may be able to be facilitated. However, the 
qualifying period under current policy settings is highly 
variable and can be lengthy. In American Samoa, for 
example, it can be up to 20 years in some circumstances, 
reflecting the government’s expressly stated desire to 
restrict migration of all kinds into the territory because 
of concerns about cultural preservation and limited na‑
tural and infrastructure resources95. In Niue, the period 
of lawful presence is set at 10 years96. By comparison, 
Fiji allows for the grant of residence to non ‑citizens who 
have been lawfully present for 5 years, but the person 
must consider Fiji97 “their home” and their presence 
must be beneficial to or in the interests of Fiji. Poten‑
tially this could be a controversial requirement in the 
context of voluntary adaptive migration.
Throughout the Pacific, family life typically invol‑
ves extended family networks spanning closely ‑knit 
communities or villages. A fundamental determinant of 
the current responsiveness of immigration policy to the 
challenges of voluntary adaptive migration and planned 
relocation is the extent to which chain migration of 
members of the wider family group, such as parents and 
siblings (and their families), is allowed. Most immigra‑
tion policies in the region have no specific provisions 
aimed at facilitating the migration of the wider family 
group. An exception in this regard is Papua New Gui‑
nea, which grants ‘special exemption‘ status for non‑
‑working aged parents of citizens, valid for 5 years98.
In the Pacific Rim, both Australia and New Zealand 
have closely controlled parent categories. In Australia, 
the category is subject to a centre ‑of ‑gravity test, in 
which at least half the applicant’s children are required 
to be Australian citizens or permanent residents, or 
eligible New Zealand citizens who are usually resident 
in Australia99. In New Zealand, the parent category has 
recently been restructured into two tiers, delineated by 
income requirements for the adult sponsor which many 
families in the Pacific diaspora would struggle to meet. 
Under “tier two” there is the additional requirement that 
91 Solomon Islands Immigration Act 2011, section 18(2).
92 See for example: Tuvalu, Persons Entitled To Enter Tuvalu Without Permit Order (CAP.25. 15. 2); Fiji, Immigration Act, 2003, Section 9(1) 
and Section 16 of the Constitution regarding ‘exempt’ status or spouse of Fiji Citizen; Solomon Islands, Immigration Act 2012, section 
17(d). Papua New Guinea grants “special exemption entry permits, valid for up to five years to spouses of citizens, see; Papua New Guinea 
Immigration and Citizenship Services Authority www.immigration.gov.pg/permanent ‑residence/ (accessed 17 October 2013).
93 See, for example, Solomon Islands Immigration Act. Section 25.
94 In the case of Papua New Guinea, this is five years; see Papua New Guinea Immigration and Citizenship Services Authority 
www.immigration.gov.pg/permanent ‑residence/ (accessed 17 October 2013).
95 See Code, Title 41 Chapter 2 41.0201 and Chapter 4, section 41.0402 and 41.0403.
96 Niue Immigration Act 2011, section 20(5).
97 Fiji Immigration Regulations 2007, Regulation 51.
98 PNG Immigration and Citizenship Services Authority, www.immigration.gov.pg/special ‑exemption/ (accessed 17 October 2013).
99 In Australia: The Aged Parent (Residence Visa (Subclass 804). See, www.immi.gov.au/migrants/family/aged/804 (accessed 17 October 2013).
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none of the parent’s children (the sponsoring child’s si‑
blings) can be usually resident in the country of origin 
(Bedford and Liu)100. As with the centre ‑of ‑gravity test 
in Australia, this requirement will rule out the parent 
category as a means of facilitating chain migration for 
many Pacific families. To this, must also be added the 
closure of the adult sibling category in New Zealand, 
further limiting the possibility for the chain migration 
of family members as a means of facilitating the volun‑
tary adaptive migration or relocation of communities 
over time.
A final feature to note is that a number of countries in 
the region have discretionary caps on the total number 
of permanent residence visas which can be granted to 
persons who do not qualify under pathways arising from 
marriage to a citizen or other privileged categories. In 
American Samoa, the cap is 50 per fiscal year101. In the 
Cook Islands, the cap on non ‑marriage related residence 
is 650102. Samoa also has an annual quota103 although, on 
the information available, the current limit is unclear, as 
is whether spousal ‑related residence is exempted from 
the quota104.
100 INZ Operations Manual F4. 1. 20 and F4.35, effective 30 July 2012 (accessed 17 October 2013).
101 Title 41 Chapter 4, section 41.0403 (4)(b).
102 Sections 4 and 5 of the Entry, Residence and Departure Act 1971‑72 (as amended in 2008). It remains to be seen whether the review of the 
country’s immigration law removes or alters the cap.
103 Immigration Act 2004, section 14.
104 The only document that has been able to be located is Public Notice S.R. 2006/02 which set the quota for the year 1 July 2005 ‑ 30 June 
2006 at 12 for persons “normally resident in Samoa, with a further 3 for those normally resident outside. Dependents under the age of 21 
were not counted. Eligibility criteria included “connections to Samoa”. It is not clear of this is meant to include connections via marriage 
thereby removing applications by spouses of Samoan citizens from the quota
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In our view, there is a need for greater attention to be given to assessing how existing laws impact upon 
population movement and allow for sustainable and dignified lives through the employment of those 
who do move across borders in the context of natural disasters and climate change. Immigration law 
and laws relating to the employment of non -resident labour can provide critical information on possible 
pathways to work and residence.
In the Pacific, immigration laws sit within and reflect a multiplicity of partially overlapping sub -regional 
clusters of states, giving rise to a highly -textured migration landscape. The textured nature of this land-
scape allows for potential leverage to better enable states to respond to various forms of mobility linked 
to natural disasters and climate change. The dynamic process of cluster formation and development pro-
vides opportunities for the enhancement of regional mobility. Existing and emerging sub -regional clus-
ters should be encouraged and supported in their attempts to foster and promote intra -cluster mobility.
6. CONCLUSIONS
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Special account needs to be taken of the variable 
patterns of population change in the region, especially 
in Melanesia where the great majority (85 percent) of the 
region’s population live. Three of these countries (Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) currently 
possess a narrow range of opportunities for underta‑
king cross ‑border movement as a means of adapting to 
environmental stressors under current policy settings. 
Enhancing the international mobility options for these 
western Melanesian populations should be a key regio‑
nal priority.
At a base level, a high degree of mobility between Pacific 
Island states is possible under the extensive visa free or 
visa ‑on ‑arrival privileges mutually extended to citizens 
of Pacific countries. This mutual privileging of entry 
of citizens in a region containing many small island 
states should be celebrated, and avenues for leveraging 
this freedom to move around in the region merit more 
detailed analysis. In the post ‑disaster setting, states 
should be encouraged to develop humanitarian policies 
which expressly allow for the temporary entry or, at the 
very least, the non ‑expulsion of non ‑nationals affected 
by natural disaster.
While the introduction of new policy mechanisms dea‑
ling with the specific situation of those affected by natu‑
ral disasters is to be encouraged, the main point we wish 
to emphasise is that, in our view, current policy mecha‑
nisms are amenable to adjustment in ways which would 
allow people affected by natural disasters, including 
those linked with climate change, to make voluntary 
choices about moving from places where environmental 
change is severely compromising long ‑term residence. 
Existing immigration laws, regulations and policies 
should be revisited with reference to:
1   Making allowance for the in ‑country change of im‑
migration status and, in particular, to allow for the 
transition from visitor to worker status.
2  Providing a pathway to residence based on a spec‑
ified period of lawful presence and stay in the host 
countries.
3  Reviewing requirements for sponsorship for resi‑
dence in cases where the applicant is from a commu‑
nity at risk to adverse effects of natural disasters and 
slow ‑onset processes linked to climate change.
4  Making allowance for the entry and stay of parents 
and other close family members of residents origi‑
nating from at ‑risk communities.
5  Increasing the flexibility of policies and capacity of 
quotas under existing bilateral special relationships 
which confer privileged rights of entry and stay 
(such as the Pacific Access Category in New Zea‑
land).
Not only will these steps increase the capacity of Pacific 
islanders to undertake voluntary adaptive migration, 
but they will promote the development of socially and 
economically entrenched diaspora in host ‑states, which 
are better able to promote the long–term relocation 
of whole communities by facilitating chain migration 
through sponsorship.
In our view, current immigration policy mechanisms, 
with appropriate adjustment and support from the 
international community, broadly provide the Pacific 
region with the tools necessary to meet, in substantial 
part, the human mobility implications of natural disas‑
ters in a climate ‑affected 21st century. We recognise that 
there will be an understandable privileging by states of 
their resident and citizen labour forces, particularly in 
those Pacific island countries with high unemployment 
in populations with significant proportions of young 
people. Nevertheless, states should be encouraged to 
review current policy settings in order to maximise op‑
portunities for sustainable voluntary adaptive migration 
by non ‑nationals who have access to employment. This 
includes policy settings that relate to land ownership 
and access to land in host ‑states by migrants. Otherwise, 
the potential exists for the creation of significant lan‑
dless communties of immigrants, forced to live under 
informal arrangements in squatter settlements.
We ackowledge that migration costs in the region can 
be prohibitively high, both in terms of costs of travel 
but also when settling at the destination end. Volunta‑
ry adaptive migration may place significant financial 
burdens on the fiscal position of host ‑states, through 
providing necessary financial support to diapsora com‑
munties and promoting sustainable livelihoods through 
employment in host ‑state economies. Financial support 
through UNFCCC adaptation funding mechanisms 
or other international funding to facilitate and sustain 
voluntary adapative migration should be considered.
Finally, it goes without saying that these immigration‑
‑related interventions need to be considered as part of 
a portfolio of responses, including up ‑skilling Pacific 
people to allow them to move within the region and 
beyond as skilled migrants. Permitting residents to hold 
dual citizenship, as recommended by the Nansen Ini‑
tiative Regional Consultation in the Pacific, is a further 
policy intervention to be included in the portfolio of 
responses.
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1. American Samoa 
•  Legal Code, Title 41, Citizenship, Alienage and Immigration
• Immigration Regulations
2. Australia
• Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
3. Cook Islands
•  None able to be located online. Information sourced via 
website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs  and Immigration
4. Fiji
•  Immigration Act 2003 
•  Immigration Act Amendment Promulgation 2008
•  Immigration regulations 2007
5. French Polynesia 
•  Information sourced via website of  French Embassy 
6. Federated States of Micronesia
•  Constitution  of FSM: Preamble  and Articles I – III
•  FSM Code,  Title 50,  Immigration Act
•  FSM Code, Title 51 : Protection of Resident Workers
7. Guam
•  Organic Act 1980
•  Immigration and Nationality Act 1980 (US)
•  Consolidation of Natural Resources Act 2008 (US)
8. Kiribati
•  Immigration Ordinance 1991(Laws of Kiribati – Revised 
edition 1980)
•  Immigration Amendment Act 2002
9. Marshall Islands
•  Immigration Act 2006
•  Labour (Non‑Resident Workers) Act 2006
•  Labour (Non‑Resident Workers (Amendment)  Act 2009
•  Compact of Free Association, as Amended (Implementation) 
Act, 2004
10. New Caledonia 
•  Noumea Acccord 1998
•  Information sourced via website of  French Embassy 
11. Nauru
•  Immigration Act  1999
•  Immigration Amendment Act 2005
•  Immigration Regulations 2000 
12. New Zealand
•  Immigration Act 2009
13. Northern Mariana Islands 
•  Immigration and Nationality Act 1980 (US)
•  Consolidation of Natural Resources Act 2008 (US)
14. Niue
•  Immigration Act 2011
•  Immigration Regulations 2011
15. Republic of Palau
•  Compacts of Free Association with US, Article IV
16. Pitcairn
•  Immigration Control Ordinance 2006
•  Right of Abode Ordinance 2010
17. Papa New Guinea
•  Migration Act 1978
•  Migration Regulations 1979
•  Employment of Non‑Citizens Act 2007
•  Employment of Non‑Citizens Regulations 2008
18. Samoa
•  Immigration Act 2004
•  Immigration Act Public Notice (10.2.06)
19. Solomon Islands
•  Immigration Act 2012
•  Immigration Act (Corrections of Errors) Order 2010
20. Tokelau
•  Immigration Regulations 1991
•  Immigration Amendment Rules 2003
21. Tonga
•  Immigration Act, Laws of Tonga 1969 (1988 Revised Edition) 
Cap 62 
•  Immigration (Amendment) Act 1988
•  Immigration (Amendment) Regulations 2010
22. Tuvalu
•  Immigration Act, Laws of Tuvalu (2008 Revised Edition) 
CAP 24.15
•  Immigration Regulations (2008 Revised Edition) CAP 
24.15.1
23. Vanuatu
•  Immigration Act 2010
•  Labour (Work Permits) Act, Laws of Vanuatu (2006 Edition), 
Cap 187, 
•  ACP‑EU Act 2001
24. United States of America
•  Immigration and Nationality Act 1980
25. Wallis and Futuna
•  Information sourced via website of  French Embassy 
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